Costs Immunity: Banishing the \u27Bane\u27 of Costs from
Public Interest Litigation by Twigg, Martin
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 36 Issue 1 Article 8 
4-1-2013 
Costs Immunity: Banishing the 'Bane' of Costs from Public 
Interest Litigation 
Martin Twigg 
Surpeme Court of British Columbia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Martin Twigg, "Costs Immunity: Banishing the 'Bane' of Costs from Public Interest Litigation" (2013) 1:1 
Dal LJ 193. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Martin Twigg* Costs Immunity: Banishing the "Bane" of
Costs from Public Interest Litigation**
For litigants raising a matter of public interest, the possibility of facing an adverse
costs award if unsuccessful may act as a deterrent to pursuing their legal claim.
The author evaluates a form of costs order called "costs immunity," referred to
as "protective costs orders" (PCOs) in the U.K., as a means of removing the
deterrent effect of costs on public interest litigants. Part I provides an overview of
costs law in Canada. Part // reviews the various types of costs orders employed
by Canadian courts to facilitate access to justice in public interest litigation. Part
Ill explores the English experience with PCOs in public interest litigation, tracking
the development of PCOs at common law Part IV addresses the decision in
Farlow v Hospital for Sick Children, the first case to articulate a test for costs
immunity orders in Canada.
La possibilit6 pour une partie 6 un litige qui soulbve une question d'intbrdt public
d'6tre condamn6e 1 payer les ddpens de la partie adverse si elle n'a pas gain
de cause peut 6tre un 6l6ment dissuasif et la d~courager d'aller de lavant et de
poursuivre sa rdclamation. L'auteur 6value une forme d'ordonnance en matibre de
ddpens appelde < ordonnance d'exemption de ddpens > (protective costs order)
au R. -U., comme moyen de supprimer Ieffet dissuasif des ddpens sur une partie
qui fait valoir l'intr&t public. La partie I de 'article est un survol des lois sur les
d~pens au Canada. La partie 11 passe en revue les divers types d'ordonnances
en matibre de ddpens utilisdes par les tribunaux canadiens pour faciliter l'acc~s
J la justice dans les litiges d'intir~t public. La partie Ill examine l'exp6rience, au
R.-U., en matibre d'ordonnances d'exemption de ddpens dans les litiges d'intbr~t
public et suit le ddveloppement de ces ordonnances en common law. La partie
IV se penche sur l'arr~t Farlow c. Hospital for Sick Children, premier cas au
Canada oO un critbre pour d~terminer s'il y a lieu de prononcer une ordonnance
d'exemption de d6pens a 6t6 articuld.
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Costs are the bane of the public law lawyer's existence. So many great
cases; so expensive and so little money to do them with.'
Introduction
Access to justice is widely recognized as one of the most fundamental
challenges facing the Canadian legal system. For an increasing number
of Canadians, the rising costs of litigation have become prohibitively
expensive, putting the price of justice beyond their reach. Speaking at the
David Hall Memorial Lecture, Lord Justice Brooke, formerly of the English
Court of Appeal, identified three sources of financial hardship currently
1. Joseph Arvay et al, Suing and Defending the Government: Materials Preparedfor the Continuing
Legal Education Seminar (Vancouver: Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia,
2006) at 3.1.1.
2. Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin has publicly stated that access to justice is a critical issue facing
the Canadian legal system "mainly for financial reasons." See Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin,
"The Challenges We Face," online: <www.scc-csc.gc.calcourt-cour/julspe-dis/bm07-03-08-eng.asp>.
According to the Chief Justice of Ontario, access to justice is the preeminent issue. See Tracey Tyler,
"The dark side ofjustice," Toronto Star (3 March 2007).
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facing litigants. Although his remarks were directed at the English legal
system, his concerns resonate throughout the Commonwealth:
What are the obstacles to public access? Three are immediately obvious.
The cost of the courts (in terms of high court fees); the cost of lawyers
(in terms of even higher professional fees) and, above all, the risk of
having to pay one's opponent's costs if one loses, and the uncertainty at
the outset of litigation as to how large those costs will be.'
The third obstacle described by Lord Justice Brooke-the prospect and
attendant uncertainty of having to pay costs to one's opponent-is the
subject of this paper. Specifically, I will examine the negative impact of
costs on litigants raising a matter of public interest and evaluate a measure
called "costs immunity," referred to as "protective costs orders" (PCOs) in
the U.K., as a potential solution.
Under the law of costs, courts generally require the unsuccessful party
in a legal proceeding to indemnify the opposing party for a proportion of
their legal expenses. The amount of the contribution can be substantial, in
some cases surpassing the value at stake in the dispute.' For this reason, the
spectre of an adverse costs award looms large in many legal proceedings
and may cause litigants to think twice before attempting to vindicate their
rights in court.' The deterrent effects of costs can be particularly harmful
in the context of public interest litigation.
It should be stated at the outset that the concept of "public interest"
is an elusive one. Definitions of "public interest litigation" and "public
interest litigant" abound in the costs literature and case law. For the
purposes of this paper, "public interest litigation" will refer to cases where
the issue at stake is of importance to the broader community and the public
has an interest in promoting access to justice in order to achieve judicial
resolution of the issue.' Generally speaking, the parties involved will be
some combination of: "(a) a government, a public authority, or a regulator;
3. Lord Justice Brooke, "Environmental Justice: The Costs Barrier" (2006) 18:3 J Envtl L 341 at
345.
4. See Erik S Knutsen, "The Cost of Costs: The Unfortunate Deterrence of Everyday Civil
Litigation in Canada" (2010) 36 Queen's LJ 113 at 115: "The cost to litigate today can quickly eclipse
the value of what is at stake in the dispute-for example, a summary judgement motion may now be
more expensive than a family car."
5. In some circumstances, the threat of a potential adverse costs award can produce positive
outcomes for the judicial system. For a discussion of costs as a filter for wasteful or vexatious litigation,
see the discussion of traditional costs principles at pages 196-198 below.
6. This definition was first formulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia
(Minister ofForests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71, [200313 SCR 371 [Okanagan] and later
adopted in an article on public interest costs by Chris Tollefson, Darlene Gilliland & Jerry DeMarco
entitled "Towards a Costs Jurisprudence in Public Interest Litigation" (2004) 83:2 Can Bar Rev 473
[Tollefson et al, "Costs Jurisprudence"].
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(b) a public interest litigant; (c) a private interest litigant; (d) a private
interest intervenor; and (e) a public interest intervenor."7
Identifying a workable definition of "public interest litigant" poses
greater difficulties, a problem discussed in Part II. Where debates over
competing criteria are not otherwise mentioned, this paper assumes that
a public interest litigant will often (though not necessarily always) be a
member of or act on behalf of a marginalized or under-represented group,
usually without the benefit of significant financial resources.' Conversely,
the opposing party will often (though not necessarily always) be a private
interest litigant, government or public authority of comparatively greater
means.' An adverse costs award will therefore tend to place a greater
financial burden on the public interest litigant in many cases.' 0
Since public interest litigation tends to engage "constitutional rights
and other issues ofbroad social significance""-everything from aboriginal
land claims to environmental regulation to the scope of fundamental rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter-the societal consequences of a
public interest litigant abandoning a claim over an inability to pay costs can
be far-reaching and severe.12 The public has an interest in obtaining a legal
resolution of such issues, regardless of the outcome, and the traditional
law of costs threatens to deprive the public of that benefit.
Courts have attempted to address this problem by adopting special rules
in favour of public interest litigants. For instance, courts will sometimes
exempt an unsuccessful litigant from paying costs if they are found to
7. This taxonomy was proposed by Perell J in Incredible Electronics Inc v Canada (AG), [2006] OJ
No 2155 at para 86, 80 OR (3d) 723 (Sup Ct) [Incredible Electronics].
8. See Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence
Society, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] 2 SCR 524 [Downtown Eastside Sex Workers], stating that one of the
ideas animating public interest litigation is "access to justice for disadvantaged persons" at para 51.
The degree of importance accorded to a public interest litigant's financial situation or tolerance for
financial risk in qualifying for public interest status is contentious. Nonetheless, the issue of finances is
often present in public interest cases and courts generally require disclosure of such information when
assessing a litigant for special costs treatment. See Incredible Electronics, supra note 7 at para 100.
9. Ibid, speaking in regards to the Attorney General of Canada involved in public interest litigation,
Perell J described the respondent as "[b]acked by the financial resources of the state" and therefore "an
empowered litigant" at para 87.
10. See The Honourable Mr. Justice John H Osler, Report of the Ontario Task Force on Legal Aid
(Ontario: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1974) [Ontario Task Force on Legal Aid], cited in Raj
Anand & Ian Scott, ',Financing Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making" (1982)
60:1 Can Bar Rev 81 at 100, n 82 [Anand & Scott]: noting that costs "operate unequally" on parties
involved in litigation against a government, public authority or large corporation, including public
interest litigants with no individual or private interest at stake at 99.
11. Okanagan, supra note 6 at para 38.
12. See Benjamin L Berger, "Putting a Price on Dignity: The Problem of Costs in Charter Litigation"
(2002) 26 Advocates' Q 235: "the great promise of Charter jurisprudence is dependent upon a litigant
clearing the practical hurdle of costs" at 236.
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have raised a legitimate issue of public importance. In rare situations,
courts may even order a victorious party to pay costs to the losing public
interest litigant. However, the issue of costs is largely a matter of judicial
discretion and the allocation of costs liability is traditionally reserved until
the end of the proceeding. Faced with such uncertainty, public interest
litigants still undertake a significant degree of financial risk when pursuing
a claim.
In the landmark case of British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v
Okanagan Indian Band, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a new
form of costs order aimed at facilitating access to justice in public interest
cases." Litigants may apply at the outset of a proceeding for an order
of "advance costs" requiring the opposing party to fund the applicant's
legal expenses over the course of litigation. While advance costs orders
provide a powerful tool for ensuring that matters of public importance
are not abandoned due to a lack of financial resources, such orders are
viewed as exceptional by courts and rarely available in practice. As a
result, most public interest litigants must take their chances with the usual
costs determination made at the end of trial.
Due to the exceptional nature of advance costs and the uncertainty
inherent in the traditional costs approach, the deterrent effect of costs
remains an on-going problem in public interest cases. Proponents of
reform have suggested that courts should more regularly address the issue
of costs at the outset of litigation. In addition to an order for advance
costs, public interest litigants could apply for a lesser measure of costs
immunity, ensuring that they would not be held liable for costs in the event
that they are unsuccessful. A preliminary determination of costs immunity
would provide a reasonable middle ground in the public interest costs
jurisprudence, offering litigants an enhanced degree of certainty over costs
without imposing significant hardship on the opposing party.
The English approach to public interest costs stands as a potential
model for Canada. In the U.K., public interest litigants have for a
number of years been able to apply to a court for protective costs orders.
Obtainable in advance of trial, PCOs exempt the applicant from costs in
one of two ways: 1) the applicant may receive costs in the event that they
are successful, but only for a modest amount, while the opposing party
will be ineligible for costs; or 2) neither party will be eligible for costs. In
either case, the threat of an adverse costs award is removed.
The Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the English approach as a
reasonable alternative to advance costs in Little Sisters Books and Art
13. Supra note 6.
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Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), providing
lower courts with an opportunity for judicial innovation in the realm of
public interest costs. 1' This invitation was recently taken up by an Ontario
trial court in Farlow v Children ' Hospital, the first case to consider
seriously the availability of costs immunity in Canada (an equivalent
to English PCOs) and develop an analytical framework for making the
order." While the decision is far from comprehensive and leaves a number
of significant legal issues unresolved, Farlow has opened a new avenue for
courts and litigants to pursue in public interest litigation.
This paper is divided into five parts. Part I provides an overview of
costs law in Canada. The default rule and traditional theory of costs are
explained, followed by the modem conception of costs as an instrument
of policy. Part 1I reviews the various types of costs orders employed by
Canadian courts to facilitate access to justice in public interest litigation.
The current approach is shown to suffer from a number of shortcomings,
highlighting the need for reform to more adequately address the deterrent
effects of costs. Part II explores the English experience with PCOs in
public interest litigation, tracking the development of PCOs at common
law. The section ends with a number of considerations for adapting the
English approach to the Canadian context. Part IV addresses the decision
in Farlow, the first case to articulate a test for costs immunity orders in
Canada. The basis for the decision is evaluated, followed by a discussion
of its consequences for the future of Canadian public interest costs
jurisprudence. A conclusion follows.
I. An overview of costs law in Canada
1. The default rule: costs follow the event
The basic rule of the law of costs states that costs follow the event. That is,
a successful party in a legal proceeding is entitled to recover a portion of
their expenses from the opposing party after judgment has been rendered
in their favour.'6 This approach, sometimes referred to as "two-way"
costs, is derived from the English model and stands in opposition to the
American "no-way" costs rule, which leaves all parties to a proceeding
responsible for their own legal expenses regardless of the outcome."
Despite the predominance of the two-way costs rule in Canada, an award
14. 2007 SCC 2, [2007] 1 SCR 38 [Little Sisters].
15. [2009] OJ No 4847, 100 OR (3d) 213 (Sup Ct) [Farlow].
16. See Okanagan, supra note 6 at para 20.
17. See Chris Tollefson, "When the 'Public Interest' Loses: The Liability of Public Interest Litigants
for Adverse Costs Awards" (1995) 29:2 UBC L Rev 303 at 304-305 [Tollefson, "'Public Interest'
Loses"].
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of costs is ultimately a matter of judicial discretion, the source of which
can be traced back to the English Court of Chancery.'" According to the
Supreme Court of Canada, "[i]n the modem Canadian legal system, this
equitable and discretionary power survives, and is recognized by the
various provincial statutes and rules of civil procedure which make costs a
matter for the court's discretion." 9 Thus, a successful litigant will typically
expect to receive costs, but a judge may depart from that presumption
where necessary in the circumstances or where a civil procedure rule so
requires. For example, Rule 77.03(2) of the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure
Rules establishes a general presumption that costs follow the event unless
a judge orders or a rule provides otherwise, while Rule 77.02(1) preserves
the general discretion of the judiciary, stating that "[a] presiding judge
may, at any time, make any order as to costs as the judge is satisfied will
do justice between the parties."
2. Traditional costs principles
a. Indemnification
Costs are generally employed to serve three primary purposes: 1)
indemnification; 2) encouraging settlement; and 3) sanctioning
misconduct.20 The first purpose, indemnification, constitutes the most
fundamental and long-standing principle of costs.2' A successful party,
having vindicated their rights in court, is entitled to compensation from
the losing party for legal expenses reasonably incurred in the process of
pursuing or defending their claim.22 This view is reflected in the rule that
costs follow the event. However, while indemnification is the primary
justification for most orders as to costs, rarely will such awards entirely
cover the costs of litigation. The usual award of "party-and-party" costs is
intended to provide only partial indemnification, although the exact amount
varies according to the particular method of calculation employed in each
jurisdiction.23 For instance, the general approach in British Columbia is
to set party-and-party costs at roughly one half of the winning party's
18. See Mark Orkin, Law of Costs, loose-leaf (consulted on 8 March 2013) (Toronto, ON: Canada
Law Book, 2012) [Orkin, Law of Costs]: "the Court of Chancery had an absolute discretion as to all
costs within its jurisdiction, proceeding not from any authority but from conscience and its inherent
power to deal with arbitrio boni vir" at 1-1.
19. Okanagan, supra note 6 at para 19.
20. See Fong v Chan, [1999] OJ No 4600 at para 22,46 OR (3d) 330 (CA) [Fong].
21. See Orkin, Law of Costs, supra note 18 at 2-58.1.
22. See Okanagan, supra note 6 at para 21.
23. This approach sets Canada apart from the English two-way costs regime, where complete
indemnification is the norm. See Incredible Electronics, supra note 7: "a difference between Canada
and England is that the benefit in Canada is a partial indemnity for the costs incurred and in England
the benefit is a complete indemnity" at para 65.
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legal fees,24 while in Nova Scotia the aim of the "tariff" set out in the
Civil Procedure Rules is to "provide a 'substantial contribution' towards
a party's reasonable expense" without resulting in complete indemnity.25
Although courts have refrained from establishing an exact proportion of
legal expenses appropriate for party-and-party costs in all circumstances,
amounts awarded generally range from 50 per cent to 75 per cent.26
The partial indemnification approach can be viewed as a compromise
in light of the significant influence-both positive and negative-that
costs exert on a litigant's behaviour. The spectre of a potential adverse
costs award acts as a deterrent against those who might otherwise have
little to lose bringing a lawsuit that is frivolous or of questionable merit,
while those on stronger legal footing will conversely be encouraged to
pursue their claim.2 7 From this point of view, the indemnification rationale,
in addition to its intuitive appeal as providing just compensation to the
victorious party, also has the fortunate consequence of preserving judicial
resources by acting as a filter for wasteful or vexatious litigation.28
However, an element of risk is inherent in all legal proceedings and there
is a danger that wholly legitimate claims may be abandoned if the threat
of an adverse costs award becomes too great.29 Partial indemnification
through "party-and-party" costs seeks to mitigate this negative outcome:
The expense of litigation is a matter of concern for all those interested
in the administration of justice, but one must have regard for the burden
which such costs place on all parties. Generally speaking, an award of
costs on a party-and-party scale to the successful party strikes a proper
balance as to the burden of costs which should be borne by the winner
without putting litigation beyond the reach of the loser.30
24. See Mark Orkin, "Costs in Family Law," in Rollie Thompson, Civil Procedure, Case Book,
(Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, 2012) at 18-5 [Orkin, "Family Law"].
25. Landymore v Hardy, 112 NSR (2d) 410, [1992] NSJ No 79 (SC) at para 10 [Landymore].
26. See Orkin, Law of Costs, supra note 18 at 2-10.
27. This proposition, along with a number of other hypothesized effects of the indemnification
rationale, were tested empirically by Hughes and Snyder when Florida substituted the English two-
way costs rule for the American no-way costs rule for medical malpractice lawsuits from 1980-1985.
Among their findings was the conclusion that "[t]he English rule likely reduces the frequency of low-
merit claims and lessens the overall probability of litigation." See James Hughes & Edward Snyder,
"Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence" (1995) 38:1
J L& Econ 225 at 249.
28. Saunders J (as he then was) put the matter rather bluntly: "Parties who sue one another do
so at their peril. Failure carries a cost. There are good reasons for this approach. Doubtful actions
may be postponed for a sober second thought. Frivolous actions should be abandoned. Settlement is
encouraged." See Landymore, supra note 25 at para 17.
29. See Orkin, "Family Law," supra note 24 at 18-16.
30. Foulis v Robinson, [1978] OJ No 3596 at para 20, 21 OR (2d) 769 (CA).
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Thus, even the traditional view of costs in Canada is tempered by a concern
for financial disincentives to litigation.
Despite the apparent moderation of the partial indemnity approach,
costs awards remain substantial, exposing all but the wealthiest of litigants
to significant financial risk. Under the Nova Scotia tariff, a five-day trial
where the amount involved in the dispute is approximately $100,000
produces a costs award of more than $22,000 under the "basic" scale.
When the reality for many Canadians is that the cost of legal fees can
readily surpass the value at stake in a dispute, the possibility of incurring
further expenses upon losing has a significant impact on behaviour."
Moreover, the deterrent effect of costs is only made worse by the large
scope ofjudicial discretion, making it difficult to predict the amount likely
to be awarded in each case.
b. Sanctioning misconduct
Although indemnification has traditionally been the primary rationale for
costs awards, courts have long used costs as a punitive measure to sanction
misbehaving litigants.3 2 Where the conduct of the unsuccessful party is
deemed to meritjudicial reproval, it is within the court's discretion to depart
from the partial indemnity approach and award costs to the successful
party on either a substantial indemnity or full indemnity basis. Sometimes
referred to as "solicitor and client" costs and "solicitor and his own client"
costs respectively, such awards are intended to more closely approximate
the actual dollar value of the successful party's legal expenses. In contrast,
misconduct on behalf of the successful party may result in a reduced costs
award or, in extreme cases, a complete denial of costs (deviating entirely
from the general rule that costs follow the event).
While a costs sanction has the potential to increase the quantum
of costs awarded against a losing party, the behaviour of a litigant is
generally a matter within their control. As a result, the substantive effect
of the punishment rationale is unlikely to impact the decision of whether
to pursue a claim in court. However, both the traditional view of costs as
indemnification, as well as the use of costs as punishment, support the
notion that the determination of costs is best left to the end of a proceeding.
31. See Knutsen, supra note 4: "[flor a middle-income Canadian who loses even a fairly standard
contract or personal injury case, such costs can be unbearable" at para 2. Although some litigants may
be motivated by factors that are not strictly monetary (e.g. revenge, the search for truth, the pursuit of
justice, etc.), damages is the primary driver for most litigation. Moreover, simply because a litigant
enters into a legal contest for a reason other than the recovery of damages does not mean that the costs
associated with litigation are of no concern to the litigant and do not shape litigant behaviour.
32. See Fong, supra note 20 at para 22.
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Only then can the conduct of the parties be fully considered and a victor
ascertained.
c. Encouraging settlement
A third purpose of costs widely recognized by courts is encouraging
settlement between parties." Where a party turns down an offer to settle
and receives a judgment at trial that is less favourable than the terms of
the rejected offer, the court may adjust the amount of costs awarded for or
against the party in light of their decision to pursue litigation unnecessarily.
For example, according to Rule 10.09 of the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure
Rules, an unsuccessful party who rejects a favourable settlement offer after
setting down for trial but before the finish date is liable to a 50 percent
increase in costs awarded against them. If the offer is made less than 25
days after pleadings close, then the increase is 100 percent. While the
settlement Rules may influence behaviour in a conventional civil dispute
where most parties engage in a simple cost-benefit analysis, cost incentives
to settle have significantly less impact in the public interest context. Not
only are the positions of parties more likely to be entrenched with matters
of public policy at stake, but public interest litigants commonly undertake
litigation to establish a particular legal precedent, a goal which is not
attainable through settlement.
3. Costs as an instrument ofpolicy
Despite the continuing influence ofthe traditional indemnification rationale,
it is now widely recognized that costs are intended to serve a variety of
policy goals. Indeed, reliance solely on indemnification has been referred
to as "outdated" by numerous courts and commentators.34 According to
the Supreme Court of Canada, the modem approach views costs "as a tool
in the furtherance of the efficient and orderly administration of justice."
This conception of costs is comparatively broad, encompassing the long-
standing uses of costs to sanction misbehaving litigants and provide
incentives to litigate based on the relative merit of the claim, as well as the
more recent goal of avoiding trial by facilitating settlement agreements.
One area of costs that has received considerable attention in recent years
is in the context of public interest litigation.
33. Ibidatpara22.
34. See Okanagan, supra note 6 at paras 22-24 citing: Mark Orkin, The Law of Costs, 2d ed (loose-
leaf) at 2-24.2; Fellowes, McNeil v Kansa General International Insurance Co., [1997] OJ No 5130,
37 OR (3d) 464 (Gen Div), MacDonald J accepted the indemnification principle generally, but called
it "outdated" in relation to the case before him at 475; Skidmore v Blackmore, [1995] BCJ No 305, 2
BCLR (3d) 201 (CA): "the view that costs are awarded solely to indemnify the successful litigant for
legal fees and disbursements incurred is now outdated" at para 28.
35. Okanagan, supra note 6 at para 25.
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Increasingly, Canadians courts have been willing to depart from
the general rule that costs follow the event in order to facilitate access
to justice where an issue of public importance is at stake. The Supreme
Court of Canada endorsed this particular use of costs as an "instrument of
policy" in Okanagan, a case involving a request by four Indian bands for
an award of costs in advance of trial in litigation over an aboriginal land
claim.16 The bands were experiencing significant financial hardship and
would likely have been unable to shoulder the enormous legal expenses
of the trial (estimated at more than $800,000) without the assistance of
an advance award of costs." In granting the order, the Court took the
opportunity to expound upon the unique considerations that apply when
dealing with issues of costs in public interest litigation. The Court stressed
that concerns regarding access to justice may necessitate a departure from
the traditional approach. In the words of Lebel J., writing for the majority:
The more usual purposes of costs awards are often superseded by other
policy objectives, notably that of ensuring that ordinary citizens will
have access to the courts to determine their constitutional rights and
other issues of broad social significance. Furthermore, it is often inherent
in the nature of cases of this kind that the issues to be determined are of
significance not only to the parties but to the broader community, and
as a result the public interest is served by a proper resolution of those
issues."
The Okanagan decision was eagerly received by public interest advocates.
For some, the principles enunciated by the Court represented an important
step toward a coherent and effective doctrine of public interest costs in
Canada. 9 First, on a simply practical level, Okanagan was seen to provide
a baseline definition of "public interest litigation," a contested term that
complicated discussions of costs in the public interest context. Justice
Lebel's dual characteristics of access to justice for "ordinary citizens" and
the presence of legal issues that are "of significance not only to the parties
36. Ibid at para 28, quoting Rogers v Sudbury (Administrator of Ontario Works), (2001) 57 OR (3d)
467 at para 19, [2001] OJ No 3346.
37. Ibidatpara5.
38. Ibidatpara38.
39. See Faisal Bhabha, "Institutionalizing Access-to-Justice: Judicial, Legislative and Grassroots
Dimensions" (2007) 33 Queen's LJ 139 at 148: "[P]ublic interest lawyers saw Okanagan as providing
the basis on which to build a comprehensive and progressive doctrine of public interest costs, with the
purpose of facilitating access-to-justice for those who would not otherwise be able to litigate issues of
fundamental public importance."
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but to the broader community" could now be used to distinguish public
interest litigation from "ordinary civil disputes."40
As for the issue of costs specifically, Okanagan was perceived as
placing an obligation upon courts to consider the financial barriers that
costs may pose to public interest litigants and adapt the rules of costs
accordingly. As one group of commentators proclaimed: "[i]t is a decision
that clearly signals to lower courts that, when making costs orders
in relation to public interest litigants, access to justice concerns are a
mandatory consideration."" While optimism surrounding Okanagan has
dampened somewhat in the years since the decision, a matter discussed
below, the general notion that costs in public interest litigation are driven
in part by concerns for access to justice remains a guiding principle.
1I. Costs awards in public interest litigation
Costs awards in public interest litigation can be divided procedurally into
two overarching categories. The first category, ex post facto cost orders,
refers to the assessment of costs at the conclusion of proceedings. This
approach represents the norm for costs generally and constitutes the vast
majority of awards in public interest cases. The second category, termed
"anticipatory" costs orders by commentators, 4 2 refers to the determination
of certain costs issues at the outset of litigation. These two approaches
have resulted in a wide range of potential outcomes relating to costs in
public interest cases. The following analysis provides an overview of the
various costs awards utilized by courts under each procedural category
to promote the concerns for access to justice discussed in Okanagan. As
we will see, Canadian public interest costs jurisprudence suffers from a
number of serious shortcomings that undermine the effectiveness of costs
awards as a means of ensuring that issues of public interest proceed to
trial.
1. Ex post facto cost orders
Incredible Electronics Inc v Canada (AG), 43 a decision on a motion for
costs, contains perhaps the most comprehensive review of case law to date
dealing with ex post facto costs awards in public interest litigation. A group
of eighteen applicants brought a Charter challenge against legislation
prohibiting the reception of foreign satellite television. However, the
40. Okanagan, supra note 6 at para 38. For an interpretation of Lebel J's comments as a definition of
public interest litigation, see Tollefson et al, "Costs Jurisprudence," supra note 6 at 479-480.
41. Ibidat477.
42. See Chris Tollefson, "Costs in Public Interest Litigation: Recent Developments and Future
Directions" (2009) 35 Advocates' Q 181 at 183 [Tollefson, "Public Interest Litigation"].
43. Supra note 7.
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application was abandoned and ultimately dismissed for failure to
prosecute, prompting the respondent Attorney General and several
intervenors (collectively "Bell ExpressVu") to claim a total of $2.2 million
in costs on a substantial indemnity basis. In dispensing with the issue,
Perell J. made a number of insightful observations and pronouncements
regarding the special treatment of public interest litigants on matters of
costs.
Justice Perell began his analysis by explaining the nomenclature of
different costs regimes. 44 As previously mentioned, Canada and England
traditionally employ a "two-way" regime. Parties are either entitled to
receive costs or liable to pay costs depending on their success or failure in
the litigation. The U.S., in contrast, employs a "no-way" regime. Parties
must generally bear their own legal costs and will never have to pay costs
to their opponent. Perell J. also discussed a third approach called "one-
way" costs, which is sometimes employed in the context of public interest
litigation:
Under this approach, a public interest litigant will recover costs if he or
she succeeds but will not be liable to pay costs if he or she fails. This
approach retains the incentive of a costs award for successful litigation
but removes the deterrent effect of an adverse costs award as factors in a
litigant's decision about whether to prosecute of defend a claim. 45
The altered incentives of the one-way regime are particularly advantageous
for public interest litigants, many of which may be subject to serious
financial constraints.46 Since the opposing party in public interest
litigation is often a government, public authority or large corporation
with comparatively deep pockets, the deterrent effect of an adverse costs
award can have a disproportionate impact on public interest litigants. 47
This is further the case where the public interest litigant has no personal or
44. Ibid at paras 65-66.
45. Ibidatpara67.
46. As the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged, public interest litigation often concerns
access to justice for disadvantaged members of society, most of whom by definition lack financial
resources. See Downtown Eastside Sex Workers, supra note 8 at para 51.
47. Ontario Task Force on Legal Aid, supra note 10 cited in Anand & Scott, supra note 10 at 100, n
82: "[slo much of today's litigation involves contests between private individuals and either the state
or some public authority or large corporation that the threat of having costs awarded against the losing
party operates unequally as a deterrent" at 99.
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pecuniary interest in the outcome of the dispute.48 One-way costs can help
remedy this imbalance.4 9
Justice Perell identified a number of circumstances in which courts
have adopted the one-way costs approach."o For example, courts have held
that an unsuccessful party raising important matters of public interest may
be relieved of paying costs to a successful government or public authority."
This reasoning has also been applied in cases that involved an element
of private interest, but where the unsuccessful party raised an important
legal point or test case.52 In some cases, a successful government or public
authority (sometimes acting as an intervenor) in a proceeding involving
matters of public interest has even been ordered to pay costs to the losing
party.53
While these cases indicate a willingness on behalf of some courts to
depart from the traditional rule that costs follow the event and adopt a
one-way regime in favour of public interest litigants, all of the precedents
highlighted by Perell J. in Incredible Electronics address the issue of costs
at the end of trial. In every case where the unsuccessful public interest
litigant was exempted from paying costs, the decision of whether or not to
pursue a claim had already been made. Minimizing the expenses incurred
by public interest litigants after the fact is certainly laudable, but leaving
the issue of costs to the conclusion of proceedings negates one of the major
benefits of a one-way regime-providing public interest litigants with the
opportunity to better predict and plan for costs in advance of litigation. For
48. Ibid, noting that the deterrent effect of costs is especially pronounced "against groups who seek
to take public or litigious initiatives in the enforcement of statutory or common law rights when the
members of the group have no particular or individual or private interests at stake" at 99.
49. Incredible Electronics, supra note 7 at paras 67-69.
50. Ibid at para 74.
51. As Perell J notes, governments regularly decline to ask for costs in public interest litigation.
Ibid at para 74, citing Allman v Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1983] NWTJ No 28, [1983]
NWTR 231 (SC); Harrison v UBC (1986), 34 BLR 57, 30 DLR (4th) 206 (SC), additional reasons
on costs, [1987] 2 WWR 378 (BCSC), rev'd (1988), 21 BCLR (2d) 145, 49 DLR (4th) 687 (CA),
aff'd [1990] 3 SCR 451, [1990] SCJ No 123; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law
v Canada (AG), 2004 SCC 4, [2004] 1 SCR 76; Sierra Club of Western Canada v British Columbia
(AG) (1991), 83 DLR(4th) 708,[1991] BCWLD 2215 (SC); Valpy v Ontario (Commission on Election
Finances) (1989), 67 OR (2d) 748, [1989] OJNo 66 (Div Ct).
52. Incredible Electronics, supra note 7 at para 74, citing Gombu v Ontario (Assistant Information
and Privacy Commissioner), [2002] OJ No 2570, 163 OAC 185 (Div Ct); Sutcliffe v Ontario (Minister
ofthe Environment), [2004] OJ No 4494, 191 OAC 370 (CA); Dickason v Governors ofthe University
ofAlberta, [1992] 2 SCR 1103, 95 DLR (4th) 439.
53. Incredible Electronics, supra note 7 at para 74, citing B(R) v Children Aid Society of
Metropolitan Toronto, [1989] OJ No 205, [1989] WDFL 643 (Dist Ct), aff'd (1992), 10 OR (3d) 321,
96 DLR (4th) 45 (CA), aff'd [1995] 1 SCR 315; Horsefield v Ontario (Registrar of Motor Vehicles)
(1999), 44 OR (3d) 73, 172 DLR (4th) 43 (CA); Schachter v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679.
Costs Immunity: Banishing the "Bane" of 207
Costs from Public Interest Litigation
this reason, the impact of one-way costs on a litigant's decision to pursue
a claim is severely hindered when applied in an ex post facto manner.5 4
The inability of public interest litigants to plan properly. for costs is
further made difficult by a lack of consistency in the jurisprudence. In the
words of Perell J., the case law is both "erratic and unpredictable."" For
every case supporting a costs regime favourable toward public interest
litigants, there seems to be an authority adopting a contrary position. For
example, Perell J. identifies instances in which unsuccessful parties have
been held accountable for costs to a public authority regardless of the fact
that an unresolved issue of public importance was raised." Courts have
also held public interest intervenors liable for costs on some occasions,
a departure from the general rule that intervenors neither receive nor pay
costs in public interest litigation.
The issue of consistency is partly attributable to the fact that there
is no authoritative test to qualify for special costs treatment as a public
interest litigant in the ex post facto context. There are two tests that appear
most frequently in the case law and academic commentary. In Incredible
Electronics, Perell J. proposes a two-stage inquiry centred on the public
importance ofthe issue at stake and the characterization of the party seeking
special costs treatment as a public interest litigant." In comparison, Justice
Ducharme in St. James'Preservation Society v Toronto (City) establishes a
five-step test aimed at answering essentially the same two questions:
1. The nature of the unsuccessful litigant.
2. The nature of the successful litigant.
3. The nature of the lis-was it in the public interest?
4. Has the litigation had any adverse impact on the public interest?
5. The financial consequences to the parties."
54. Tollefson, "Public Interest Litigation," supra note 42 at 185: "[f]rom a public interest litigant's
perspective, ex post facto adjudication of costs, even under a regime that recognizes the existence of
a public interest costs exception, generates a significant and ever-increasing deterrent to proceeding,
particularly for parties that are risk averse or of modest means."
55. Incredible Electronics, supra note 7 at para 74.
56. Ibid at para 74, citing Vriend v Alberta (1996), 184 AR 351, 141 DLR (4th) 44 (CA); Campbell
v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2001 BCSC 1400, [2001] BCJ No 2068; Operation Dismantle
Inc v Canada, [ 1985] 1 SCR 441, [1985] SCJ No 22; Reese v Alberta (Ministry ofForestry, Lands and
Wildlife) (1992), 133 AR 127, 13 CPC (3d) 323 (QB).
57. Incredible Electronics, supra note 7 at para 74, citing Lavigne v OPSEU(1986), 55 OR (2d) 449,
29 DLR (4th) 321, aff'd [1991] 2 SCR 221; Daly v Ontario (Attorney General), [1999] OJ No 3405,
124 OAC 152 (CA).
58. Chris Tollefson terms the two stage inquiry developed by Perell J the "public importance" test
and the "public interest litigant eligibility test." See Tollefson, "Public Interest Litigation," supra note
42 at 190-191.
59. [2006] OJ No 2726 at para 17, 272 DLR (4th) 149 (Sup Ct).
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While it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate either test in detail
to reconcile the competing approaches, both tasks already undertaken
elsewhere,60 it should be noted that the differences are not merely
formalistic. There is considerable debate concerning the essential qualities
that make up the public interest litigant and, to a lesser extent, public
interest litigation generally. This debate is the ultimate cause of the "erratic
and unpredictable" case law cited by Perell J. While it is not my intention
to resolve all such issues definitively, it is helpful for the subsequent
discussion of anticipatory costs orders to identify a number of areas that
have proved particularly contentious.
Outstanding issues in the law
In a seminal article on public interest costs in Canada, "Financing Public
Participation in Environmental Decision Making," authors Raj Anand
and Ian Scott proposed one of the earliest definitions of "public interest
litigation." According to Anand and Scott, their approach was both
"intuitive" and "neutral.""' Rather than aligning with any particular political
or policy orientation (such as "pro-industry" or "anti-development" in
environmental cases), Anand and Scott argued that public interest litigation
should encompass all points of view that are not adequately represented by
parties with a significant personal or economic interest in the outcome of
the proceeding. This would exclude issues backed by an "industry or other
well-organized constituency."6 2
Although the Anand and Scott definition is relatively broad, some
courts have adopted an even lower threshold, focusing solely on a lack of
adequate representation regardless of whether the view is being advanced
by parties with a personal or economic interest in the proceeding. In
Canadian Bar Association v British Columbia," the B.C. Court of Appeal
dismissed an action brought by the Canadian Bar Association claiming
various inadequacies of the legal aid system in B.C. on the basis of
insufficient pleadings. In dealing with the issue of costs, the Court found
that the case qualified as public interest litigation because the lawsuit was
"prompted by concern for those unable to obtain representation or legal
advice."' This finding was made despite the fact that a successful action
60. See Tollefson, "Public Interest Litigation," supra note 42 at 189-197; Graham Mayeda,
"Access to Justice: The Impact of Injunctions, Contempt of Court Proceedings, and Costs Awards on
Environmental Protestors and First Nations" (2010) 6:2 McGill JSDLP 143 at paras 56-6 1.
61. Anand & Scott, supra note 10.
62. Ibid at 81-82, quoting Simon Lazarus & Joseph Onek, "The Regulators and the People" (1971)
57:6 Virginia LR 1069.
63. 2008 BCCA 92, 76 BCLR (4th) 48.
64. Ibidatpara 58.
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would have "increase[d] the quantum of legal fees paid to lawyers, many
if not most of whom are members of the Association.""5
On the surface, the above definitions focus primarily on a single
factor-lack of representation-while overlooking a more obvious
requirement: public interest litigation must be in the interest of the
public.6 6 It is difficult to imagine a true public interest case where the
issue at stake does not transcend the interests of the parties involved in the
dispute. It is possible that this criterion is simply treated as self-evident by
some courts and commentators and therefore goes unstated. This might
explain the finding in Canadian Bar Association that the case was of a
public interest nature, especially as the court acknowledged the potential
benefits to the public of enhanced legal aid elsewhere in the decision.67
With this in mind, the concept of public interest litigation laid down by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Okanagan offers a more complete definition.
As discussed earlier, commentators have interpreted Lebel J.'s remarks as
identifying two characteristics: public interest litigation must 1) provide
access to justice for ordinary citizens (a requirement functionally similar
to "inadequate representation") and 2) resolve a legal issue of significance
to the broader community.68 However, while Okanagan may help to clarify
the concept of public interest litigation, the decision stills leaves a number
of questions unanswered that continue to be a source of disagreement.
Many of these issues relate to the criteria a party must meet to qualify as a
"public interest litigant" entitled to special costs treatment.
First, to what extent can a public interest litigant have a personal,
proprietary or pecuniary interest in the outcome of a decision?69 This
question looms large in nearly every discussion of public interest costs
because the concept's scope acts as a major limiting factor for entitlement.
65. Ibid at para 3. The court nonetheless refused to take into account the public interest nature of
the proceeding due to defective pleadings, resulting in an award of costs against the Canadian Bar
Association.
66. Incredible Electronics, supra note 7 at para 91: "[O]ne trait of a public interest litigant seems
obvious. A public interest litigant, at a minimum, must, in a dispute under the adversary system, take
a side the resolution of which is important to the public."
67. Supra note 63, noting that success in the action would "enhance[e] legal aid to members of the
community" at para 3 and that "the action is intended to assist low-income members of the public and
its spirit is commendable" at para 58.
68. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
69. As the earlier discussion of Anand and Scott's article "Financing Public Participation in
Environmental Decision Making" reveals, some definitions of "public interest litigation" also preclude
a certain degree of self-interest in the proceeding. This highlights the overlap of criteria that can exist
between the many competing definitions of "public interest litigation" and "public interest litigant."
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Chris Tollefson suggests that comments made by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Odhavji Estate v Woodhouse"o are instructive:
[T]he Supreme Court of Canada has opined that the concept of public
interest litigant embraces two types of public interest litigants: (a) those
that have no direct, pecuniary or other material interest in the proceeding
(i.e. non-profit non-government organizations (NGOs)); and (b) those
litigants that possess a private or pecuniary interest that is modest in
comparison to the costs of mounting the proceeding (i.e. an interest that
ordinarily would make it uneconomic to litigate the case)."
However, the decision in Woodhouse clearly attributes the proposed
definition to the plaintiffs' submissions. Rather than providing an express
endorsement of the dual classification, the Court only notes that the
plaintiffs, who were seeking millions of dollars in damages, "do not fit
their own definition of a public interest litigant."72 Nonetheless, the Court
did deny public interest status to the litigants despite finding that issues
of public importance had been raised. As a result, the case supports the
notion that a significant private interest will count against a party arguing
for special costs treatment as a public interest litigant, especially where the
interest entails a large financial reward.
Again, Incredible Electronics provides the most comprehensive
analysis of the issue. According to Justice Perell, "the conventional view
is that a public interest litigant must, to some extent, manifest unselfish
motives."" This typically translates into a definition of public interest
litigant that values altruism and excludes parties pursuing financial gains
that are more than minor, such as the situation in Woodhouse. However,
Perell J. stresses that such factors operate more effectively as indicia than
strict criteria. Okanagan Indian Band stands as an excellent example. An
aboriginal land claim could result in a considerable financial award if
successful, yet the Supreme Court of Canada did not find the self-interest
of the bands to be problematic in that case.
Other considerations canvassed by Perell J. include whether a party is
a member of or acts on behalf of a marginalized or disadvantaged group of
society, as well as other, more abstract qualities such as "courage, loyalty,
patriotism, dedication to a worthy cause, and the pursuit of justice."7 4
In essence, Perell J. espouses a more flexible approach suitable to what
70. 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 SCR 263 [Woodhouse].
71. Tollefson, "Public Interest Litigation," supra note 42 at 191.
72. Woodhouse, supra note 70 at para 76.
73. Incredible Electronics, supra note 7 at para 95.
74. Ibid at para 98.
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he calls the 'je-ne-sais-quoi quality" that appears to characterize public
interest litigation in the case law."
While it could be argued that abstract qualities like courage and
patriotism are too vague to act as workable criteria, comments made by
the Supreme Court of Canada in the context of public interest standing
suggest that representation of marginalized or disadvantaged groups may
be a valid characteristic for consideration. In Canada (Attorney General) v
Downtown Eastside Sex Workers UnitedAgainst Violence Society, a former
sex worker and an organization that advocates on behalf of sex workers
applied for public interest standing to challenge the constitutionality of
prostitution provisions under the Criminal Code. In the process of granting
the order, Justice Cromwell wrote on behalf of an unanimous Court that
"one of the ideas which animates public interest litigation is that it may
provide access to justice for disadvantaged persons in society whose legal
rights are affected.""
A second issue, related to the first, is the significance of a party's
financial circumstances. Should a public interest litigant receiving funds
from a government program or benefiting from pro bono legal services
be less likely to receive favourable costs treatment? What if the party
pursuing a matter in the public interest is quite wealthy? According to
Justice Perell, "the point is not so much whether the public interest litigant
is affluent or impecunious but whether having regard to the benefit of
ensuring their participation, they ought to be immunized from an adverse
costs consequence."" As we will see, courts have taken a much more
strict approach in the context of anticipatory costs, generally requiring the
public interest litigant to demonstrate impecuniosity.
A third unresolved issue concerns whether it is appropriate to
depart from traditional costs rules in favour of a public interest litigant
where the opposing litigant is a private party. Courts and commentators
generally agree that an unsuccessful party raising a genuine issue of public
importance should, at a minimum, not be liable to pay costs to government
or a public authority. 8 However, governments already frequently decline
to request costs in public interest proceedings." Although a public interest
75. Ibid at para 99.
76. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers, supra note 8 at para 51 [emphasis added].
77. Incredible Electronics, supra note 7 at para 100.
78. Ibid at para 106: "[t]here is some sense to this outcome when the victorious litigant is a
government, a public authority, or a regulator. They are already within the public sector and can be
expected to act for the public."
79. Ibid at para 74, noting that "governments frequently do not ask for costs in cases of public
interest litigation."
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litigant genuinely concerned about the impact of an adverse costs award
may nonetheless be unwilling to rely on a likely exercise of goodwill by
government, much of the utility of a special costs regime for public interest
litigation depends upon the willingness of courts to order private parties to
subsidize the legal costs of public interest litigants. Unfortunately, many
courts have not been overly hospitable to such an approach."o
In Re Sierra Club of Western Canada v British Columbia (Chief
Forester), the Sierra Club unsuccessfully challenged a decision regarding
a timber harvesting quota assigned to the logging company MacMillan
Bloedel."' Although the Sierra Club was found to be advancing a position
that was clearly in the public interest, Justice Smith held the non-profit
organization liable for costs on the basis that MacMillan Bloedel "is a
private citizen, not a public agency."82 This view has been strongly
criticized by commentators as overly simplistic, failing to consider the
vast financial disparities between the parties and the broader context in
which the dispute arose. According to Chris Tollefson, Smith J.'s decision
ignores the fact that public interest litigation involving private parties often
concerns issues of state-conferred entitlements to scarce public resources:
These cases usually involve challenges to the way government has
allocated rights in public resources to private interests for the purposes
of profit, whether that "resource" is a right to pollute air, to harvest
Crown timber or to dam a river. There is a strong public interest in
ensuring that these arrangements are subjected to regular and careful
public supervision, including judicial scrutiny."
The issue of an opposing private party in public interest litigation also arose
in Incredible Electronics. Perell J. considered both positions described
above and ultimately sided with Tollefson's reasoning.84 As a result, Perell
J. ruled that both the respondent Attorney General and the intervenor Bell
ExpressVu, which benefited from a state conferred monopoly, should be
treated as public authorities subject to the one-way costs award rule. Perell
J. also noted the practical point that exempting liability to one party but
not the other "would be similar to avoiding a car only to be hit by a train,"
80. See Tollefson, "Public Interest Litigation," supra note 42 at 193: "[m]any courts have tended to
treat as self-evident the notion that a prevailing private litigant in these circumstances should receive
its costs."
81. [1994] BCJ No 1713, 117 DLR (4th) 395 (SC).
82. Ibidatpara55.
83. Tollefson, "'Public Interest' Loses," supra note 17 at 316.
84. Incredible Electronics, supra note 7 at para 109.
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effectively defeating the policy justification behind the recognition of
public interest status in costs proceedings."
2. Anticipatory costs orders
In Okanagan, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized for the first
time an alternative to ex post facto cost orders in public interest cases.
As previously mentioned, there was a danger that the plaintiffs in the
case, four First Nations bands involved in aboriginal land claims, would
not be able to proceed to trial due to a lack of financial resources. After
acknowledging the need to deviate from traditional costs rules in certain
circumstances where access to justice is at stake, the Court endorsed the
use of "interim costs"-a costs award made in advance of trial-in public
interest litigation. According to Lebel J. writing for the majority, interim
costs orders "avoid unfairness by enabling impecunious litigants to
pursue meritorious claims with which they would not otherwise be able to
proceed."" Lebel J. also noted that the power to make an award for costs
in advance of trial is part of the courts' equitable jurisdiction as to cost and
exists independently of any express statutory authorization."
A party seeking an order for interim costs (sometimes referred to as
"advance costs") in public interest cases must satisfy three requirements:
1. The party is unable to pay for the litigation and no other realistic
option exists for bringing the issue to trial;
2. The claim is prima facie meritorious;
3. The issues raised are of public importance and have not been
resolved in previous cases.88
Finding that all three requirements had been met in the case before them,
the Court ordered the provincial government to pay costs to the bands in
advance of trial.89 The parties were to agree on a procedure whereby the
bands would receive costs on an on-going basis as deemed appropriate
by the Chambers judge in light of the complexity of the litigation. The
Court also imposed a number of conditions on the order to avoid any
"temptation" by the bands to shirk financial responsibility and prolong the
dispute unnecessarily.9 o
Many public interest lawyers and academics had high hopes for the
future of public interest litigation following the decision in Okanagan.
85. Ibid at para 110.
86. Okanagan, supra note 6 at para 34.
87. Ibid at para 35.
88. Ibid at para 40.
89. Ibid at paras 46-47.
90. bid at paras 17, 47.
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For some, the decision was seen as "providing the basis on which to
build a comprehensive and progressive doctrine of public interest costs,
with the purpose of facilitating access-to-justice for those who would not
otherwise be able to litigate issues of fundamental public importance." 91
Critics of the decision, however, raised fears that the judicial system would
be overrun by a torrent of interim costs applications.92 Neither view has
proved correct.
While Okanagan enunciated some important principles regarding
the role of costs in facilitating access to justice, the practical impact of
interim costs orders made available to public interest litigants has been
minimal. In a review of interim costs applications brought in the two years
following Okanagan, Chris Tollefson found that the ensuing jurisprudence
"amounted to little more than a trickle" with a success rate that was
"modest at best."93 Litigants were slow to request interim costs and courts
made such orders sparingly.9 4
Enthusiasm among public interest advocates was further dampened
when the Supreme Court of Canada revisited the issue of interim costs
in Little Sisters." The plaintiff in the case, a gay and lesbian bookstore in
Vancouver, B.C., had previously won a constitutional challenge brought
against Canada Customs for detaining material at the border deemed to
be "obscene." When the plaintiff brought a second lawsuit alleging that
the unconstitutional conduct was never properly addressed, a request was
made for advance costs. Little Sisters struggled as a business to make a
profit and the legal expenses likely to be incurred at trial were estimated
at more than $1 million. However, a 7-2 majority of the Court rejected the
funding application, ruling that Little Sisters failed to show impecuniosity
and sufficient public importance.
Although Little Sisters did not alter the test for advance costs as
originally articulated in Okanagan, the language employed by the majority
in dismissing the claim appears to marginalize the availability of such
orders. Emphasizing the extraordinary nature of advance costs, Bastarache
and Lebel JJ. writing for the majority cautioned that Okanagan "was an
evolutionary step, but not a revolution."96 Advance costs should only be
91. Bhabha, supra note 39 at 148.
92. See David Gourlay, "Access or Excess: Interim Costs in Okanagan" (2005) 63 UT Fac L Rev
Ill.
93. Chris Tollefson, "Costs and the Public Interest Litigant: Okanagan Indian Band and Beyond"
(2006) 19:1 CJALP 39 at 43 [Tollefson, "The Public Interest Litigant"].
94. Ibidat 55: "[p]erhaps not unexpectedly, courts have been in no rush to embrace Okanagan. More
surprisingly, however, is that neither have public interest litigants."
95. Supra note 14.
96. Ibid at para 34.
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awarded in public interest cases as a "last resort"" under circumstances
that are "rare and exceptional."" The plaintiff, despite raising some
legitimate concerns, was unable to meet this high standard.
The decision in Little Sisters makes it clear that orders for advance
costs will be granted sparingly. As Faisal Bhabha puts it in his article
"Institutionalizing Access-to-Justice: Judicial, Legislative and Grassroots
Dimensions," it is now apparent that Okanagan represents "not an opening
but, rather, the high watermark of public interests costs doctrine."99
3. Proposals for reform
Our survey of public interest costs jurisprudence reveals two extremes of
potential costs orders, neither of which provides public interest litigants
with an adequate opportunity to plan for legal expenses over the course of
a trial. At one end of the spectrum are ex post facto cost orders, which leave
the discretionary matter of costs to the end of the proceeding. Not only are
such orders inherently unpredictable, but their uncertainty is compounded
by a confusing and sometimes contradictory jurisprudence marred by
unsettled legal issues. At the other end of the spectrum are advance costs
awards, the only form of anticipatory costs currently available to public
interest litigants. While undoubtedly a powerful tool for facilitating access
to justice, courts are reluctant to grant such orders except in the most
extraordinary of circumstances. In light of these problems, it is necessary
to canvass an alternative measure that would be more widely available to
public interest litigants yet still capable of addressing issues of uncertainty
as to costs.
There is substantial room for judicial innovation between the two
extremes of ex post facto costs orders and advance costs. One approach is
to expand the category of anticipatory costs to include the same types of
orders that are currently available in the ex post facto context. Rather than
limiting applicants to the extraordinary measure of advance costs, public
interest litigants could also request a one-way or no-way costs regime
immunizing them from an adverse costs award. This would remove the
deterrent effect of costs on public interest litigants, while avoiding the
more contentious aspects of advance costs. Even if the application was
denied, the applicant would come away with a better understanding of the
likely costs outcome at the end of trial. The applicant could then make an
informed decision whether to continue with the litigation in the face of a
potential adverse costs award.
97. Ibid at para 36.
98. Ibid at para 38, quoting Okanagan, supra note 6 at para 1.
99. Bhabha, supra note 39 at 148.
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The notion of a preliminary determination of costs in public interest
litigation is by no means novel. Proposals for such a regime date back
several decades, well before the advent of advance costs in Okanagan.
One of the first recommendations was made by Anand and Scott in
their 1982 article "Financing Public Participation in Environmental
Decision Making."100 Concerned that traditional costs rules were a serious
impediment to public interest litigants, particularly when appearing as an
intervenor before tribunals overseeing environmental assessments, the
authors put forward a number of reform proposals. One suggestion, based
upon recommendations in the 1974 Report of the Ontario Task Force on
Legal Aid calling for the availability of adverse costs immunity at the
conclusion of proceedings,"0 ' argued that the same protection should be
available in advance of trial:
We advance for consideration an alternative fee-shifting proposal which
would involve an exercise of administrative or judicial discretion to
institute a one-way cost rule at an early stage in the proceedings. Some
time after initiating or intervening in proceedings, the public participants
would have to apply for "certification" as a cost-exempt group in much
the same way as plaintiff class representatives do under Rule 23 of The
American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 102
The Ontario Law Reform Commission made a similar proposal in its 1989
Report on the Law of Standing.'0 Litigants would be protected from an
adverse costs award if the court was satisfied of the following conditions:
1. the litigation would need to raise issues of importance beyond the
immediate interests of the parties;
2. the plaintiff would not have any personal, pecuniary or proprietary
interest in the outcome of the litigation or, if such an interest did
exist, it would not justify the litigation economically;
3. the litigation could not present issues previously judicially
determined against the same defendant; and
4. the defendant would need to have a clearly superior capacity to
bear costs of the proceeding.'"
100. Supra note 10.
101. Supra note 10 at 99, cited by Anand & Scott, supra note 10 at 100, n 82.
102. Anand& Scott, ibid at 114-115.
103. (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1989) [Report on Standing]. Observations regarding
the Report's conclusions are obtained from Tollefson et al, "Costs Jurisprudence," supra note 6.
104. Report on Standing, supra note 103 at 153-154, 161, 184-185.
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Like Anand and Scott, the Commission recommended that the order be
made available at any stage in the proceeding.'o
Most recently, Chris Tollefson took up Anand and Scott's
recommendations in a series of articles advocating for the determination
of costs at the outset of public interest litigation.' According to Tollefson,
it could be argued that the access to justice principles set out in Okanagan
impose a procedural obligation on courts to adopt such an approach.' 7
In his latest article, "Costs in Public Interest Litigation," Tollefson turns
his attention to England, "the jurisdiction where anticipatory costs orders
in public interest cases have evolved the furthest." 0 In particular, he
considers the recent development of protective costs orders as a source
of guidance for Canadian courts. PCOs are a form of costs order made in
advance of trial immunizing the applicant from an adverse costs award.
First recognized by an English trial court in 1999,109 the availability of
PCOs was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in the landmark case of R (on
the application of Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry."o
The English approach to public interest costs merits particular attention
in light of some obiter comments made by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Little Sisters. Stressing the need to consider a range of alternatives prior
to granting an order for advance costs, the Court endorsed the use of an
adverse costs immunity order as an intermediate measure and cited the
Corner House decision with approval:
Finally, different kinds of costs mechanisms, like adverse costs
immunity, should also be considered. In doing so, courts must be careful
not to assume that a creative costs award is merited in every case; such
an award is an exceptional one, to be granted in special circumstances.
Courts should remain mindful of all options when they are called upon
to craft appropriate orders in such circumstances. Also, they should not
assume that the litigants who qualify for these awards must benefit from
them absolutely. In the United Kingdom, where costs immunity (or
"protective orders") can be ordered in specified circumstances, the order
105. Ibid at 163, 185.
106. Tollefson, "The Public Interest Litigant," supra note 93 at 60; Tollefson et al, "Costs
Jurisprudence," supra note 6 at 507-508; Tollefson, "Public Interest Litigation," supra note 42.
107. Tollefson, "The Public Interest Litigant," supra note 92 at 60: "likely the most important way
that Okanagan could be elaborated from an access to justice perspective is to argue that it implies a
procedural obligation on courts to regularly consider making 'alternative' costs orders at the outset of
litigation in public interest cases."
108. Supra note 42 at 197.
109. R v Lord Chancellor exp Child Poverty Action Group, [1998] 2 All ER 755, [1999] 1 WLR 347
[Child Poverty].
110. [2005] EWCA Civ 192, [2005] 4 All ER I [Corner House] (emphasis added).
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may be given with the caveat that the successful applicant cannot collect
anything more than modest costs from the other party at the end of the
trial: see R. (Corner House Research) v. Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2600, [2005] EWCA Civ 192, at para. 76. We
agree with this nuanced approach."'
Binnie J. and Fish J., the two dissenters in the case, adopted a similar
position: "[i]t is true that an order for advance costs should not be made
where a lesser costs order would suffice, such as protective costs orders,
which ensure that plaintiffs or applicants in public interest litigation do not
have costs orders made against them at the conclusion of proceedings."" 2
Thus, despite closing the door on advance costs as a widely available order
in public interest cases, the Supreme Court of Canada in Little Sisters
appears to have opened another.
The recommendation by the Supreme Court of Canada to consider
PCOs has so far only been taken up by a lone Ontario trial court in the
case of Farlow."3 In attempting to develop a test for PCOs for the first
time in Canada, the trial judge draws from a number of sources, including
the decision in Corner House. Given the English experience in this area,
English case law is likely to play a significant role in the future development
of PCOs in Canada. It will therefore be helpful to review the emergence of
PCOs overseas before examining the Farlow decision in detail.
III. The English approach: protective costs orders
R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Child Poverty Action Group (Child Poverty)
was the first decision to recognize the availability of PCOs in the U.K."4
Justice Dyson of the Queen's Bench heard two separate interlocutory
costs applications together brought by non-profit organizations. In the first
case, a prominent anti-poverty organization applied for judicial review
of a decision excluding participants in social security proceedings from
entitlement to legal aid. In the second case, two human rights organizations
concerned with the abolition of torture sought judicial review of a decision
by the Director of Public Prosecutions to not prosecute two individuals for
the possession of an electric shock baton contrary to firearms legislation.
All of the applicants requested immunization from a potential adverse
costs award based on the public interest nature of the issues raised.
Preferring the term "pre-emptive costs orders" to "protective costs
orders" proposed by the applicants, Dyson J. was quick to conclude that the
11l. Little Sisters, supra note 14 at para 40 (emphasis added).
112. Ibid at para 135 (emphasis added).
113. Supra note 15.
114. Supra note 109.
Costs Immunity: Banishing the "Bane" of 219
Costs from Public Interest Litigation
decision to immunize a party in advance of a proceeding clearly fell within
the court's wide discretion on the matter of costs under the Civil Procedure
Rules."' However, such an order should only be granted in exceptional
circumstances. Two reasons were provided. First, it is sometimes difficult
to gauge whether an issue will be of sufficient public importance to justify
a departure from the traditional rule that costs follow the event during an
interlocutory application. Public importance may only become clear once
all of the arguments have been heard and the case has been judged on its
merits."6 Second, and related to the first, it is difficult to make a sufficient
assessment of the merits of the claim at the interlocutory stage."' With
these observations in mind, Dyson J. set out a test for PCOs:
[T]he necessary conditions for the making of a pre-emptive costs order
in public interest challenge cases are that the court is satisfied that the
issues raised are truly ones of general public importance, and that it has a
sufficient appreciation of the merits of the claim that it can conclude that
it is in the public interest to make the order... The court must also have
regard to the financial resources of the applicant and respondent, and
the amount of costs likely to be in issue. It will be more likely to make
an order where the respondent clearly has a superior capacity to bear
the costs of the proceedings than the applicant, and where it is satisfied
that, unless the order is made, the applicant will probably discontinue the
proceedings, and will be acting reasonably in so doing."'
Applying the test to the cases before the court, both applications
were denied. Dyson J. deemed the litigation too premature to ascertain
whether the issues at stake were of sufficient public importance and the
arguments advanced of sufficient merit. Also, it was found that two of the
parties would have continued with the litigation regardless of whether they
obtained the order.
1. The Corner House decision
The English Court of Appeal decision in Corner House is the leading
authority on PCOs.l 9 Corner House, a non-profit organization involved in
advocacy work relating to corruption, brought an application for judicial
review challenging a change of procedure by the Export Credits Guarantee
Department of the Department ofTrade and Industry. Corner House alleged
that the changes weakened anti-corruption protection in the awarding of
government contracts on the international market. Corner House applied
115. Ibid at 761.
116. Ibidat 765.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid at 766.
119. Supra note 110.
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for a PCO during the proceeding and was denied at first instance. The
Court ofAppeal overturned the decision, but only granted the order subject
to the condition that any costs recoverable would be capped at $25,000.
Undertaking a review of the jurisprudence on public interest costs and
PCOs, the Court of Appeal revisited the decision in Child Poverty and its
interpretation in subsequent lower court cases. In the process, the Court
of Appeal touched upon the Supreme Court of Canada decision to award
advance costs in Okanagan. Described as going "one step further" 20 than
PCOs, the Court of Appeal noted that advance costs orders were beyond
their jurisdiction under the Supreme Court Act 1981121 as interpreted by
the House of Lords in Steele Ford & Newton (a firm) v CPS.12 2 Reference
was also made to the 1989 report by the Ontario Law Reform Commission
calling for the availability of a judicial tool similar to that of PCOs.123
Agreeing with Dyson J. that PCOs should only be awarded in "the
most exceptional circumstances,"'24 the Court of Appeal settled on the
following guiding principles when considering an application for such an
order:
(1) A PCO may be made at any stage of the proceedings, on such
conditions as the court thinks fit, provided that the court is satisfied
that:
(i) the issues raised are of general public importance;
(ii) the public interest requires that those issues should be
resolved;
(iii) the applicant has no private interest in the outcome of the
case;
(iv) having regard to the financial resources of the applicant and
the respondent(s) and to the amount of costs that are likely to
be involved it is fair and just to make the order; and
(v) if the order is not made the applicant will probably discontinue
(the proceedings and will be acting reasonably in so doing.
(2) If those acting for the applicant are doing so pro bono this will be
likely to enhance the merits of the application for a PCO.
(3) It is for the court, in its discretion, to decide whether it is fair and just
to make the order in the light of the considerations set out above.125
120. Ibid at 55.
121. (UK), c 54.
122. Ibid at 77. In Steele Ford & Newton, [1993] 2 ALL ER 769 at 780-781, [1994] 1 AC 22 at 40-
41, the House of Lords ruled that the Supreme Court Act 1981, which governs the courts' discretion
as to costs, does not confer the power to award costs out of central funds without express statutory
authorization.
123. Corner House, supra note 110 at 42, citing Report on Standing, supra note 102.
124. Corner House, supra note I10 at 72.
125. Ibid at 74.
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The Court added that a cap on the costs recoverable by the party receiving
the PCO will almost always be necessary. Such a cap should be modest,
limited to "solicitors' fees and a fee for a single advocate ofjunior counsel
status that are no more than modest."12 The only situation in which a cap
will not be necessary is when pro bono counsel is seeking a PCO and
the court institutes a no-way costs regime. On the issue of costs for the
application seeking a PCO, the court stated that both parties must bear
some degree of liability in order to "provide an appropriate financial
disincentive for those who believe that they can apply for a PCO as a
matter of course or that contesting a PCO may be a profitable exercise."' 27
2. Post-Corner Housejurisprudence
In R (Compton) v Wiltshire Primary Care Trust (Compton), the English
Court of Appeal heard three appeals concerning the requirements of
PCOs.128 The decision provided the Court with an opportunity to clarify
a number of the principles established in Corner House and has arguably
had the effect of increasing the accessibility of PCOs in the U.K.
The appeals arose out of two judicial review proceedings brought
by Compton challenging the decision of Wiltshire Primary Care Trust
(WPCT) to close two hospital units. PCOs were utilized in both instances.
In the first judicial review proceeding, which concerned the closure of a
day unit, the PCO stated that WPCT would be unable to recover costs from
Compton, but costs recoverable by Compton from WPCT were capped at
£25,000. In the second proceeding, which involved a minor injuries unit,
the terms of the order were reversed. Compton was unable to recover costs
from WPCT, but the costs recoverable by WPCT from Compton were
capped at E20,000.
In the view of Waller L.J., the primary issue on appeal engaged the first
two requirements of the Corner House test: 1) whether the applications for
judicial review raise serious issues of general public importance; and 2)
whether the public interest requires the issues to be resolved.129 WPCT
argued that the requirement of "general public importance" cannot be met
where an issue is of a purely local nature, such as the closure of a hospital.
Moreover, the exceptionality of PCOs as originally stated in ChildPoverty
126. Ibid at 76.
127. If an application is denied based on written submissions alone, proportionate costs should not
exceed £1,000. If renewed and contested at an oral hearing, proportionate costs should not exceed
£2,500. If there are more than one defendants or one or more interested parties contesting the
application, one additional set of costs may be awarded. Ibid at 78-81.
128. [2008] EWCA Civ 749, [2009] 1 All ER 978 [Compton].
129. Ibid at para 12.
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should be incorporated into the Corner House test as a stand-alone
requirement.13 0
A majority of the Court (Waller L.J. and Smith L.J. with Buxton L.J.
dissenting) upheld the decisions to award PCOs to Compton. In the leading
opinion, Waller L.J. made clear that the factors laid out in Corner House
are not to be read in an overly restrictive way or as statutory provisions. I31
Accordingly, the requirement that an issue be of general public importance
does not mean that it must be of interest to the public on a national scale.
Matters that are local in nature, including the closure of a hospital, may
still meet the standard.'32
Moreover, the exceptional nature ofprotective costs orders as originally
stated in Child Poverty was not intended in Corner House to constitute an
additional requirement of "exceptionality." According to Smith L.J., "the
only function of the Corner House endorsement of Dyson J.'s statement
was to serve as a reminder that PCOs are not to be routinely made and that
it will be a rare case which meets all the requirements.""'
Finally, courts should avoid an all or nothing approach to protective
costs orders. The judiciary should use their discretion to award a range of
orders of varying strength based upon the degree to which the applicant
has satisfied the Corner House test. In the words of Smith L.J.:
It seems to me as a matter of common sense, justice and proportionality,
that when exercising his discretion as to whether to make an order and if
so what order, the judge should take account of the fullness of the extent
to which the applicant has satisfied the five Corner House requirements.
Where the issues to be raised are of the first rank of general public
importance and there are compelling public interest reasons for them
to be resolved, it may well be appropriate for the judge to make the
strongest of orders, if the financial circumstances of the parties warrant
it. But where the issues are of a lower order of general public importance
and/or the public interest in resolution is less than compelling, a more
modest order may still be open to the judge and a proportionate response
to the circumstances.134
130. Ibid at para 65.
131. Ibid at para 23.
132. Ibid at para 24.
133. bid at para 83.
134. Ibid at para 87.
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Commentators have suggested that the refinements in Compton have
made PCOs more accessible to public interest litigants."' Indeed, Buxton
L.J. writing in dissent took issue with the expansive interpretation of the
majority:
The effect of the decision in this case is very greatly to extend the types
of cases in which, if other requirements are fulfilled, a PCO can be made.
And although judges retain a discretion to refuse nonetheless to make
PCOs, it is difficult to see how a judge could use that discretion to refuse
a PCO in the type of case in which the making of a PCO has been upheld
by this court and there were no policy factors (for instance, collusion or
the creation of an artificial case) that militated against it.1 6
Despite Buxton L.J.'s reservations, the approach ofthe majority in Compton
was affirmed by a unanimous Court ofAppeal in a subsequent case dealing
with protective costs, Re (Buglife-The Invertebrate Conservation Trust)
v Thurrock Thames Gateway Development Corporation.'3 7
In Buglife, an environmental organization dedicated to the protection
of invertebrates brought an application for judicial review challenging
the decision of a local planning authority. Although the application was
dismissed, Buglife obtained a PCO limiting the costs recoverable by both
parties in the proceeding to £10,000. Buglife subsequently appealed the
judicial review decision and requested an additional PCO to cover the
appeal proceedings. After reviewing the relevant principles for PCOs,
the Court of Appeal stated that "the correct approach is for us to follow
Corner House as explained by Waller L.J. and Smith L.J.,"'3 8 confirming
the majority's reasons in Compton. The Court then awarded a further PCO
for the appeal proceedings, again limiting the costs recoverable by both
parties to i10,000, ruling that the Corner House principles should apply
on appeal just as they do at first instance.13 9
Another requirement of PCOs that has been relaxed since Corner
House is the stipulation that "[t]he applicant has no private interest in the
outcome of the case." 40 Initially, the no private interest requirement was
interpreted quite strictly by the judiciary, including the Court of Appeal
135. Andrew Lidbetter, Anna Condliffe & Nusrat Zar, "Protective Costs Orders in Judicial Review
Proceedings" (28 October 2008), online: International Law Office <http://www.internationallawoffice.
com/Newsletters/Detail.aspx?g-a6cb88ba-733d-4eaa-a3fl-67ddl2baebe2>: "[airguably, the inter-
pretation of the Corner House principles by the majority of the Court of Appeal in Compton has
increased the likelihood of these orders being granted in future cases."
136. Compton, supra note 128 at para 70.
137. [20081 EWHC Civ 1209, [2009] Env LR 18 [BugIfe].
138. Ibidatparal9.
139. Ibid at para 32, quoting Corner House, supra note 110 at paras 47-49.
140. Corner House, supra note 110 at para 74.
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in Goodson v HM Coroner for Bedfordshire and Luton.141 Following
the death of Goodson's father during a medical procedure, Goodson
applied to the coroner requesting a full inquiry and the appointment of
an independent medical expert. The coroner rejected the application,
prompting Goodson to seek judicial review in conjunction with an order
for protective costs. The Court of Appeal denied the PCO partly on the
basis of Goodson's personal, yet non-pecuniary, interest in the outcome of
the case.14 2 However, this approach was criticized heavily by courts and
commentators in the years following Goodson, prompting the Court of
Appeal to reevaluate its position in Morgan v Hinton Organics (Wessex)
Ltd & CAJE (Hinton Organics).14
Hinton Organics concerned an action for private nuisance brought by
two residents against a nearby composting company. The issue ofprotective
costs was raised for the first time by the residents on appeal following an
award of costs from an interim application. The Court declined to provide
the order given that costs had already been incurred, calling the issue
"redundant," but nonetheless felt obliged to address the role of private
interests in PCOs due to past controversy.'" After reviewing a trend in
the case law diluting the private interest requirement, the Court of Appeal
noted the incongruity of its position in Goodson with the later "flexible"
approach to the Corner House test advocated in Compton. In the end, the
Court concluded that "the 'flexible' basis proposed by Waller L.J., and
approved in Buglife should be applied to all aspects of the Corner House
guidelines," including the private interest requirement.145
While it is now clear that the private interest requirement cannot
be interpreted restrictively, there are still limits to the flexible approach
in Compton. In Eweida v British Airways PLC,146 an employee brought
an employment discrimination claim against British Airways that was
dismissed at the tribunal level. After receiving leave to appeal, the
141. [2005] EWCA 1172, [2005] All ER 122 [Goodson].
142. Ibid at paras 26, 28. Goodson argued that a strict application of the no personal interest
requirement would make it "all but impossible" to obtain a PCO in judicial review proceedings where
an element of personal interest is nearly always present. Despite ruling in favour of a strict application
of the test, the Court appeared to agree, noting that the lack of private interest required for a PCO
would effectively disentitle Goodson to standing. "It is her relationship to her father that gives her
both the interest in seeking relief by way ofjudicial review and sufficient standing in law to pursue her
claim. As [Goodson] was constrained to accept, it is unlikely that she would have been entitled to take
similar action to challenge the verdict resulting from an inquest on a stranger whose death occurred at
the same hospital."
143. [2009] EWCA Civ 107 [Hinton Organics].
144. Ibid at paras 35-56.
145. Ibid at para 40.
146. [2009] EWCA Civ 1025.
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employee unsuccessfully applied for a PCO in the appeal proceedings. The
decision relating to the PCO was also challenged at the Court of Appeal.
In disposing of the issue, the Court acknowledged the recent emphasis on
flexibility following Compton, but drew a line between public law and
private law disputes: "[i]t was not public law litigation, but a private claim
by a single employee against her employer. A [PCO] could not be made
in private litigation." 47 Moreover, even if the private law aspect was not
determinative, the Court stressed that the result would be the same:
Even if the private interest condition can be applied with some flexibility,
the appellant's private interest is too significant to make it appropriate to
treat the case as within the Corner House principles."'
Accordingly, the PCO was denied on appeal.
The English Supreme Court has heard a number of appeals involving
protective costs. However, the core principles animating PCOs outlined in
Corner House have never been in issue, nor has the general structure of
the test been questioned. In R (on the application ofEdwards and another)
v Environment Agency and others, a case involving a relatively complex
procedural history, the Supreme Court faced an appeal from a decision
by two Supreme Court cost officers interpreting the Corner House test
in light of international obligations and EU law.14 9 While the decision
may have significant consequences in U.K. courts, increasing access to
PCOs for applicants engaged in public interest litigation involving certain
environmental issues, its relevance in the Canadian context is likely
minimal as Canada is not a signatory to the international agreement at
issue in the case.150
147. Ibid at para38.
148. Ibid at para 39.
149. [2010] UKSC 57, [2011] 1 All ER 785; an appeal was originally made to the House of
Lords. After a decision had been laid down, but before the issue of costs had been determined, The
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 transferred jurisdiction from the House of Lords to the Supreme
Court. Two costs officers were then appointed to settle the matter of costs. The decision of the costs
officers was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.
150. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus
Convention), of which the UK is a signatory, imposes on member states the obligation to ensure public
participation in environmental decision-making. Article 9 provides that members of the public with
a sufficient interest must have access to review procedures to challenge the legality of environmental
decisions, and that the review procedures must be "fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively
expensive." The Aarhus Convention is incorporated into EU law through art 10a of the EU Council
Directive 85/337/EEC and art 15a of EU Council Directive (EC) 96/61. One of the issues before the
Supreme Court concerned the correct application of the EU Directives to procedures in environmental
proceedings, including the Corner House test for protective costs orders.
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3. A model for Canada?
The test for PCOs outlined in Corner House bears a number of similarities
to the test for advance costs in Okanagan. Perhaps this is not surprising
given the attention devoted to Canadian public interest costs jurisprudence
by the English Court of Appeal in Corner House. Most notably, applicants
in both instances must demonstrate an issue of public importance requiring
resolution. The requested costs order must also be necessary, meaning that
the applicant would be unable to reasonably continue the litigation without
it."' Corner House even makes reference to the "exceptional" nature of
PCOs, echoing the language of the Supreme Court of Canada in Okanagan
and Little Sisters.'52
The primary difference between the two approaches lies not in their
analytical structure but in the nature of the potential orders granted.
Advance costs are a comparatively extreme measure appropriate only in
the rarest of circumstances. The select few cases in which courts have
granted such orders attest to that fact. Although PCOs are also intended
to be exceptional, they can at least be tailored to fit a variety of situations.
Taking into consideration the nature of the dispute and the financial
circumstances of the parties involved, courts can order one-way costs
with a cap or dispense with costs altogether and implement a no-way costs
regime. PCOs therefore offer a more flexible and realistically attainable
solution to public interest litigants seeking to avoid the uncertainty of a
potential adverse costs award.
In light of the utility of PCOs and their endorsement by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Little Sisters, the time now seems ripe to
call for their adoption in Canada. However, Chris Tollefson warns that
"[w]hile opportunity awaits, Canadian public interest litigators should be
somewhat wary to unconditionally advocate for the English Corner House
approach."' 3 In support of a cautionary approach, Tollefson cites a number
of concerns identified by a UK working group chaired by Lord Justice
Maurice Kay examining the role of PCOs in public interest litigation.15 4
First, significant criticism has been directed at the no private interest
requirement, an issue that has proved equally contentious in Canadian
151. Okanagan arguably adopts a higher standard requiring the applicant to show "no other realistic
option," (at para 40) while Corner House proposes a less stringent threshold of "will probably
discontinue" (at para 74).
152. Advance costs are clearly more "exceptional" than PCOs, however, given the English Court of
Appeal's remarks that advance costs are beyond their jurisdiction.
153. Tollefson, "Public Interest Litigation," supra note 42 at 200.
154. Civil Liberties Trust, Litigating the Public Interest: Report ofthe Working Group on Facilitating
Public Interest Litigation (London: Liberty, 2006) [Civil Liberties Trust, Public Interest].
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academic and judicial circles."' Tollefson notes that "on its face, this
would exclude a party pursuing a human rights complaint from obtaining
a PCO."" 6 However, the debate surrounding the no private interest
requirement has not gone unnoticed by English courts. Critical opposition
to the rule prompted the Court of Appeal to re-examine the issue in Hinton
Organics and confirm the need for a flexible approach in applying all of
the Corner House criteria.'5"
Moreover, English case law suggesting that PCOs should be
available only in public law litigation is less persuasive when viewed in
the Canadian context. In Eweida, the Court based its decision to deny a
litigant public interest status on the private nature of anti-discrimination
claims. In Canada, however, human rights statutes are treated as "quasi-
constitutional"' and perform a decidedly public function, namely to
"protect against discrimination and to guarantee rights and freedoms.""
Second, concerns have been raised regarding the English Court of
Appeal's insistence in Corner House that nearly all PCOs implementing
a one-way costs regime should limit the fees recoverable to a modest
amount. If the cap is set too low, such as a fee chargeable byjunior counsel,
a party of modest means might be unable to receive competent legal
representation.' 60 While a strict application of the rule will likely lead to
unfairness in some instances, it could be argued that costs capping provides
a reasonable counterbalance to a measure currently viewed by English
courts as extraordinary. If courts are uncomfortable with providing one
party with complete immunity from costs while leaving the opposing party
exposed to an indeterminate amount, placing a limit on fees recoverable
could simply be viewed as a quid pro quo.16' It should also be noted that
the issue of cost capping does not apply where no-way costs are ordered.
Regardless of which position proves correct, the English debate over
cost capping in PCOs may have less relevance in the Canadian context.
Unlike in the U.K. where cost capping is employed as a stand-alone
measure for case management purposes,162 Canada has little experience
155. Ibid at paras 77-85.
156. Tollefson, "Public Interest Litigation," supra note 42 at 200.
157. Hinton Organics, supra note 143 at paras 35-56.
158. Gould v Yukon Order ofPioneers, [1996] 1 SCR 571, [1996] SCJ No 29.
159. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de lajeunesse) v Boisbriand (City),
2000 SCC 27 at 36, [2000] 1 SCR 665.
160. Civil Liberties Trust, Public Interest, supra note 154 at para 93.
161. Ibid at para 95.
162. See Various Ledward Claimants v Kent and Medway Health Authority and Another, [2003]
EWHC 2551, [2003] All ER 12 (QB) at para 11: Hallett J ordered a cap on costs to address "a real risk
that costs have been and will be incurred unnecessarily and unreasonably."
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with such orders. In Corner House, the need for cost capping in PCOs
was largely taken for granted and may reflect aspects of the English costs
system that have no parallel in Canada. For instance, the Court of Appeal
cited a case supporting the use of cost capping orders where a plaintiff
is pursuing a claim without the benefit of "after-the-event" insurance,' 6 1
noting that the underlying principles "will always be applicable" when
considering a PCO.'" However, legal insurance has yet to take hold in
Canada in provinces other than Quebec and does not figure prominently
in judicial reasoning on matters of costs. While Canadian courts may
find it necessary to attach conditions to a PCO for the purposes of case
management-a recommendation made by the Supreme Court of Canada
in regards to advance costs orders' 6 5-it is not readily apparent why the
English predilection for cost capping should be taken up in Canada. If
courts are concerned that public interest litigants will prolong litigation
unnecessarily, then such behaviour can be factored into a costs award at
the end of trial in the event that they are successful. A cap on costs only
runs the risk of undervaluing the actual extent of legal expenses incurred
during the course of litigation.
Third, it has been argued that the preference accorded to PCO
applicants whose counsel is acting pro bono could limit the number of
lawyers willing to take on important public interest cases.'66 This could
certainly be problematic, especially for firms that rely on legal aid work
and would not be able to afford to take on cases pro bono.'6' However, the
danger is somewhat overstated. Many of the cases that are of sufficient
public importance to justify a PCO will tend to attract competent counsel
for reasons other than remuneration, such as professional development or
a personal commitment to the cause. 161 Moreover, the Court of Appeal
in Corner House only stated that pro bono representation would enhance
an application for a PCO, not act as a bar against those with paid legal
counsel.
163. "After-the-event" insurance is a form of legal insurance covering the policyholder against
expenses incurred during litigation. Unlike "before-the-event" insurance, which is taken out to cover
potential future litigation, "after-the-event" insurance is taken out after an event giving rise to a legal
dispute and is sometimes demanded by lawyers acting under a contingency fee agreement.
164. Corner House, supra note 110 at para 76, citing King Telegraph Group Ltd, [2004] EMLR 429
at paras 101-102, [2005] EWCA Civ 192.
165. See Little Sisters, supra note 14 at paras 42-43: courts making an order for advance costs may
require the applicant to "relinquish some manner of control over how the litigation proceeds" by, for
example, setting limits on the chargeable rates and hours of legal work.
166. Civil Liberties Trust, "Public Interest," supra note 154 at para 96.
167. Ibid at para 96.
168. Ibid at para 95, noting that cases involving PCOs "will almost inevitably be ones that lawyers are
keen to take on for reasons of professional development."
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Although these issues may not be as significant as critics make them
out to be, Tollefson is correct to advise against the wholesale adoption of
the English approach in Canada. Given the availability of advance costs
to Canadian litigants-a form of costs order not recognized in the U.K.-
PCOs would represent an intermediate measure between the two extremes
of ex post facto orders and advance costs. The test for PCOs as set out
in Corner House may therefore need to be relaxed in Canada in order to
avoid significant overlap with the Okanagan criteria. With this in mind,
perhaps the most important lesson to be taken from the English context is
the need for flexibility. The requirements for PCOs are not to be strictly
construed and courts should be prepared to tailor the order in a manner
most appropriate for each case. This would ensure that a wide range of
litigants raising issues of public importance would be provided with at
least some degree of costs protection in cases where they are unable to
qualify for the more extraordinary order of advance costs.
IV. Costs immunity in Canada
1. Farlow v Hospital for Sick Children
In 2009, an Ontario trial court heard an argument for protective costs in
the case of Farlow v Hospital for Sick Children.' The plaintiffs, parents
of a child who died of a congenital genetic disorder, brought an action
for medical negligence in Small Claims Court against the hospital and
two doctors involved in the child's care.o70 The defendants filed a motion
to transfer the proceedings to Superior Court and exempt the action
from simplified procedure. The plaintiffs were willing to agree to the
transfer under the condition that the court immunize them from a future
costs award. The decision provides the most comprehensive overview of
protective costs jurisprudence to date by a Canadian court, as well as the
first articulation of a legal test for costs immunity (the Canadian equivalent
to PCOs) in Canada.
After briefly surveying the law of costs relating to public interest
litigants, Herman J. noted that she "was not...referred to any Ontario cases
in which a party has been immunized from a costs award prior to trial.""'
However, three Canadian cases were identified as relevant to the issue, as
169. Supra note 15.
170. Shortly after commencing their civil claim, the Farlows filed a complaint with the Ontario Human
Rights Commission alleging discrimination in the provision of medical services on the grounds of
family status and disability. The human rights complaint was dismissed as statute barred due to the
ongoing civil litigation. See Farlow v Hospital for Sick Children, 2009 HRTO 739, [2009] OHRTD
No 728.
171. Farlow, supra note 15 at para 81.
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well as the civil procedure rules in two Canadian jurisdictions. The first
case mentioned, Little Sisters, contains the brief endorsement of protective
costs by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The second case, 1465778 Ontario Inc v 1122077 Ontario Ltd,
addresses the issue of whether costs can be awarded to a public interest
litigant in cases where the opposing party is a private litigant. In disposing
of the issue, the Ontario Court of Appeal made remarks about public
interest costs in obiter that Herman J. interpreted as a reference to the
availability of PCOs:
Where a case is brought to assert a Charter claim or other matter of
general public importance, different considerations may apply when
deciding whether to award costs in favour of the pro bono party. In
those cases, for example, it may be appropriate for the court to consider
potentially insulating the pro bono party from exposure to costs, or
limiting the party 's exposure, in order to facilitate the resolution of an
important public issue by the court. The principles that will be applied in
this type of litigation will also develop as the cases arise.'72
Herman J.'s interpretation of the above passage is arguable, as the
statements were made during a traditional costs proceeding at the end of
trial. However, the use of the words "in order to facilitate the resolution of
an important public issue" could be a reference to concerns over adverse
costs awards that act as a deterrent to initiating public interest litigation.
The third case, (WA) v St. Andrew's College, concerns a motion to
substitute an individual as a representative plaintiff in a class action law suit
prior to certification, but only on the condition that the new representative
plaintiff be granted costs immunity." The court denied the motion, finding
that costs immunity was contrary to the intention of the legislature in class
proceedings as indicated by the Class Proceedings Act.'74 The Act does not
contemplate the possibility of immunizing litigants from future liability
and financial arrangements designed to assist class litigants are already
available through the Class Proceedings Fund."' Moreover, such a result
would fetter the discretion of the trial judge in a subsequent certification
proceeding, which the Court noted is often the most costly stage of class
action litigation. Despite the ruling against costs immunity, however, the
consequences of the decision are likely limited due to the unique cost rules
in class action proceedings.
172. [2006] OJ No 4248 at para 47, 82 OR (3d) 757 (CA), as quoted in Farlow, supra note 15 at para
82 (emphasis added).
173. [2008] OJ No 352, 164 ACWS (3d) 23 (SCJ).
174. SO 1992, c 6.
175. Law Society Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding), 1992 SO, c 7.
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Herman J. also took into consideration the civil procedure rules in
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador. Both jurisdictions allow
an impecunious litigant to apply for relief from costs in advance of trial.
According to Rule 77.04 of the Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules:
77.04 (1) A party who cannot afford to pay costs and for whom the risk
of an award of costs is a serious impediment to making, defending, or
contesting a claim may make a motion for an order that the party is to
pay no costs in the proceeding in which the claim is made.
There are no reported cases of an applicant successfully invoking the rule.
However, most requests for immunity denied under 77.04 were raised
at the end of trial during a traditional costs proceeding,' 6 with only one
reported case involving a request on a preliminary motion. 7 Moreover,
courts have granted relief from costs due to poverty under the old Civil
Procedure Rule 5.17.178
In Mills v Halifax County Municipality et al, a group of nursing home
residents claiming discrimination by a number of municipalities and the
provincial government in the payment of varying amounts of "comfort
allowance" brought an application under Rule 5.17.19 Justice Davison
ruled that the matter should be addressed before him in chambers and
not be put over to trial, as the outcome would impact the decision of
the applicants to continue with or abandon the litigation. Moreover, the
chambers judge disagreed with the notion that a party exempted under the
Rule should not be able to receive costs, holding that the intent of the Rule
was to provide relief only to the impecunious party.
176. See Mader v Hatfield, 2011 NSSC 121, [2011] NSJ No 183, a request for a costs exemption
following the resolution of an adverse possession claim was denied based on insufficient evidence of
poverty; Farrell v Casavant, 2010 NSSC 46, [2010] NSJ No 43, dealing with the issue of costs in an
unsuccessful personal injury claim arising out of an automobile accident, the court stressed that the
financial circumstances of the losing party are rarely considered when determining costs outside of a
family law context. While a few exceptions were noted, no evidence of financial circumstances aside
from annual income, such as assets and liabilities, was submitted to the court; Peraud v Peraud, 2011
NSSC 80, [2011] NSJ No 120, the court had access to detailed financial records while addressing the
issue of costs in a divorce proceeding and was not convinced by the professed poverty of the party
invoking the rule.
177. See MacBurnie v Halterm Container Terminal Ltd Partnership, 2011 NSSC 322, 306 NSR (2d)
197, stressing that the criteria for the rule should be stringently applied, the court found that the
applicant had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of financial hardship. Moreover, the applicant was
unable to show that a costs immunity order was necessary to continue with the litigation because he
had entered into a contingency fee agreement with his lawyer.
178. See McGean v McGean, [1992] NSJ No 455 (SC); Mills v Halifax County Municipality et al
(unreported Chambers decision) 15 September 1992 in Rollie Thompson, Civil Procedure, Case Book
(Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, 2012) at 18-28 [Mills].
179. Mills, supra note 178.
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Not all courts have demonstrated such a sophisticated understanding
of the impecuniosity Rule. Justice Gruchy in Rafuse v Zink's Bus Co
denied a costs exemption to a bus driver in a wrongful dismissal claim
despite finding that the plaintiff met the requirements under the Rule.s 0
Nonetheless, Gruchy J. expressed concern that a litigant granted immunity
from costs "would be able to pursue the defendant to the point of causing
financial harm to the defendant."'"' Gruchy J. made no attempt to
substantiate the danger, however, suggesting that the outcome of the case
was actually attributable to a fundamental disagreement with the nature of
the Rule itself.
The old Nova Scotia Rule 5.17 is nearly identical to Rule 7.19 under
the Newfoundland and Labrador Rules of the Supreme Court, which states:
7.19 (1) Any person who lacks the financial means to commence or
defend a proceeding may apply to the Court to be exempt from the
payment of all or any of the costs and fees which may be payable by that
person as a party in the proceeding.
(2) When an applicant under rule 7.19 (1) has satisfied the Court
that
(a) the applicant has complied with the legal aid regulations of
the provincial plan providing legal aid or similar services,
with respect to commencing or defending a proceeding
thereunder; or
(b) the applicant is entitled to the exemption applied for even
though the applicant has not complied with the legal aid
regulations; and
(c) the applicant files with the Court a legal opinion that
sets out the material facts in issue in the proceeding and
establishes that the applicant has reasonable grounds for
commencing or defending the proceeding;
the Court may
(d) exempt the applicant from the payment of all or any of the
costs and fees in the proceeding;
(e) assign a solicitor or counsel, or both, to assist the applicant;
or
(f) grant such other order as is just.
180. [1992] NSJ No 514, 122 NSR (2d) 183 (SC).
181. Ibid at3.
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There are only two reported cases dealing with rule 7.19, both of which
denied requests for adverse costs immunity.8 2
After completing a review of the jurisprudence, Herman J. turned to
the task of outlining a test for costs immunity at common law. Recognizing
that Canadian courts have broad discretion to structure costs orders
appropriate in the circumstances, Herman J. set out a list of guiding factors
adapted from three sources: the criteria for advance costs in Okanagan;
the criteria for PCOs in the U.K.; and the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland
civil procedure rules. 183
First, a court must start from the proposition that "the granting of a
costs immunity award is exceptional."' 84 Other factors may then be taken
into account, including: "whether the applicant's financial circumstances
are such that the applicant would probably not proceed absent such an
order; the extent to which the public has an interest in the issues being
litigated; and the potential impact of such an award on the other parties."''
The language employed by Herman J. seems to indicate that none of the
three factors are determinative and the list is non-exhaustive. Finally, courts
should be attentive to "the risk that the party that has been immunized from
a costs order may fail to be accountable for the time and money expended
on the case."'86 For this reason, Herman J. suggests that parties subject to
the order. may be required to cede some control of the proceedings to the
court, as recommended by the Supreme Court of Canada in Little Sisters.
Applying the above factors to the case at hand, Herman J. rejected
the claim, finding that the applicant failed to meet all three criteria of the
test.' First, the applicants did not provide adequate financial information
to allow the court to determine if a potential adverse costs award would
constitute a significant deterrent. Second, there was insufficient evidence
concerning the costs of litigation to properly judge the impact of a costs
182. See Thompson v Seabright, 2008 NLTD 82 at paras 10-18, [2008] NJNo 135, a self-represented
litigant brought an ex-parte application invoking Rule 7.19 in advance of trial, but failed to satisfy the
court of several requirements. Insufficient evidence was provided showing financial need as required
under either subsection (2)(a) or (b) and, most importantly, no legal opinion was submitted showing
reasonable grounds for commencing the proceeding as required under subsection (2)(c). Moreover,
even if such an opinion was included, the court found that the action was barred under the Statute of
Limitations. See also, Williams v Williams, [1999] NJ No 254, 179 Nfld & PEIR 283 (CA), Rule 7.19
was invoked by a husband during a child support proceeding. Denied at trial, the application of the
Rule was again rejected on appeal. Not only did the husband fail to submit evidence in support of each
of the three requirements under subsection (2) of the Rule, but the last minute nature of the request also
justified the trial judge's exercise of discretion in denying the application.
183. Farlow, supra note 15 at para 93.
184. Ibid at para 94.
185. Ibidatpara95.
186. Ibid at para 96.
187. Ibid at paras 98-100.
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immunity award on the defendants. Herman J. also noted that the two
doctors being sued were private litigants, suggesting that the outcome may
have differed if the government was a party to the litigation. Finally, the
claim lacked a sufficient public interest element. Despite acknowledging
that the issue before the court "may well be of interest to the public,"
Herman J. concluded that a failure to hear the case would not amount to
"an injustice to the public."'" The plaintiffs were only seeking monetary
damages, not a change in law, policy or practice that would address
systemic problems in society.
2. Reflecting on Farlow
As the first case to consider the criteria for costs immunity in Canada, Farlow
offers a tentative first step towards establishing a more comprehensive and
effective public interest costs jurisprudence. No longer will litigants be
caught between a rock and a hard place, forced to overreach by requesting
the extraordinary measure of advance costs-formerly the only costs order
available to public interest litigants at the outset of a proceeding-or leave
the issue until the end of trial and accept the uncertainty inherent in an ex
post facto order. Litigants may now cite precedent recognizing a "third
way," a new form of anticipatory costs order offering a potential antidote
to the deterrent effect of costs liability in public interest cases. Despite
such promise, however, the decision is not without its problems.
One of the primary concerns relates to the sparse analytical framework
set out by Herman J. Although she is able to marshal significant support in
favour of recognizing a new form of anticipatory costs order, the section
of the decision devoted to costs is relatively brief and only three short
paragraphs deal with the actual criteria for granting costs immunity. The
end result is a test that seems far from authoritative and provides minimal
guidance to future litigants attempting to craft an argument for such an
order.
The brevity of the decision raises another problem. Herman J. leaves
many of the contentious legal issues that have long complicated the case
law on public interest costs unresolved. At what point does a dispute
qualify as public interest litigation? How does the presence of a private
litigant affect the analysis? Are parties eligible for costs immunity if they
have a personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case? While
Herman J. provides some implicit hints to these questions in her analysis,
no attempt is made to confront such issues directly.
188. Ibid at para 100.
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The exceptionality factor included in the criteria for costs immunity
is also problematic. First, the requirement is arguably unnecessary. Even
with the recognition of access to justice as an important costs principle in
Okanagan, the Supreme Court of Canada made clear in Little Sisters that
"the general rule based on principles of indemnity, i.e., that costs follow
the cause, has not been displaced."' 89 Since courts should not depart from
this rule "except for very good reasons," any situation justifying a public
interest costs order will necessarily be special.'90
Second, stressing the exceptional nature of costs immunity only serves
to conflate the order with advance costs. This raises additional problems.
Are advance costs orders more exceptional than costs immunity orders? If
so, how much more exceptional? Moreover, the primary utility of allowing
costs immunity orders in Canada lies in their being realistically attainable
by public interest litigants, providing a reasonable middle ground between
advance costs and ex pQst facto orders. Although PCOs are sometimes
referred to as exceptional by English courts, no equivalent to advance costs
exists in English jurisprudence. Any attempt to delineate the availability of
costs immunity orders in Canada should be mindful of the full spectrum of
costs orders presently available in the Canadian context.
In fairness, these analytical failings cannot necessarily be attributed
entirely to the court. It is possible that Farlow was simply not the ideal
case to break new legal ground on public interest costs. The Farlows were
self-represented and their arguments presumably suffered as a result.
Any litigant seeking special costs treatment due to impecuniosity should
reasonably expect the court to require the disclosure of proper financial
information,'9 ' yet the Farlows offered minimal evidence on this front.
Poor advocacy was further compounded by weak facts, which pushed the
case to the fringes of acceptability for public interest litigation. As Herman
J. took care to highlight, the government was not a party to the dispute
and two of the defendants were private litigants. The Farlows were also
seeking a substantial monetary award, not a change in law or policy that
would more clearly be of interest to the public at large.
As discussed earlier in this paper, commentators have argued that
the presence of a private party defendant or a plaintiff with a pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the case should not always act as a bar to special
189. Little Sisters, supra note 14 at para 34.
190. Ibid at para 34, quoting Orkin, Law of Costs, supra note 18 at 2-39.
191. Notably, many of the cases denying relief from costs under the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland
and Labrador civil procedure rules also involved self-represented litigants who failed to present a
proper picture oftheir financial situation to the court. See supra notes 175, 176, 180 and accompanying
text.
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costs treatment where matters of public interest are at stake. However,
the Farlows were likely ill-equipped to make such arguments to the court.
On such a novel issue of law, one which is beset by a complicated and
sometimes conflicting jurisprudence regarding public interest status,
Herman J.'s analysis would almost certainly have benefited from the
submissions of well-prepared counsel for the plaintiff. In this regard,
Farlow can be viewed as a missed opportunity.
Nonetheless, Farlow still has value to public interest advocates.
Although a number of key legal questions remain unresolved, at least they
can now be addressed at the outset rather than the end of costly litigation.
Moreover, the test for costs immunity laid down by Herman J., while
admittedly short on detail, offers considerably more flexibility than the
comparatively strict test for advance costs. The factors for consideration
are non-exhaustive and none are wholly determinative. Most importantly
though, by grounding the decision in three clear sources of authority-the
Supreme Court of Canada's approach to public interest costs in Okanagan
and Little Sisters, the English case law dealing with PCOs and the civil
procedures rules in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador-
Herman J. has laid the foundation for the development of costs immunity
orders in Canada. It will now be the task of future courts and litigants to
build upon that foundation by engaging substantively with the issue on a
deeper level.
Conclusion
Canadian public interest costs jurisprudence has in the past employed an
"all or nothing" approach. In the rarest of circumstances, public interest
litigants might benefit from the tremendously powerful order for advance
costs, forcing the opposing party to fund the costs of litigation. Most likely,
however, the issue of costs would be left to the end of trial, exposing public
interest litigants to the uncertainty inherent in the traditional ex post facto
order. For many litigants with limited means, the spectre of an adverse
costs award may prove too great of a deterrent, forcing them to abandon
litigation which would be in the public interest to proceed. However, the
Farlow decision has opened the door to a "third way," allowing litigants to
seek immunization from costs at the outset of a proceeding.
In future, advocates of costs immunity should position the measure as
a reasonable middle ground between the two extremes of advance costs
orders and ex post facto orders. Special care should be taken to ensure that
the criteria for costs immunity are sufficiently distinct from the criteria for
advance costs. As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Little Sisters,
costs immunity merits consideration before an award of advance costs.
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Immunization from costs, although a departure from traditional costs
rules, is a comparatively conservative measure and the requirements
needed to obtain such an order should be less onerous as a result. Stressing
the "exceptional" nature of costs immunity is not helpful in this regard.
One way to distinguish the criteria for costs immunity from advance
costs would be to lessen the impecuniosity requirement. In many cases,
organizations devoted to public interest litigation will have money set
aside for a particular legal dispute or test case and the threat of an adverse
costs award will not prevent the matter from proceeding to trial. However,
most public interest organizations must balance a variety of functions
within a limited budget and the threat of an additional costs burden may
deter an organization from pursuing other activities, including other
avenues of public interest litigation. In Okanagan, the substantial cost of
litigation was problematic not simply because the bands were unable to
afford legal representation, but also because they would have been unable
to address other needs essential to their communities.' 92 Rather than
requiring an applicant to show that they would not proceed to trial absent
an order for costs immunity in all cases, courts should allow evidence in
the alternative that an adverse costs award would limit the ability of the
applicant to pursue other activities-litigation in particular-which is also
in the public interest.
Ideally, public interest costs jurisprudence would be broadly available
and highly adaptive, capable of producing a range of preliminary orders
suited to a variety of circumstances. If an issue is of the highest public
importance and an impecunious litigant, having exhausted all other
funding options, would be unable to proceed to trial without financial
assistance from the opposing party, then an order for advance costs
may be justified. If a party is engaged in public interest litigation with a
government or other public authority and the threat of an adverse costs
award would operate as a significant deterrent to pursue the claim, then
a costs immunity order implementing a one-way costs regime may be
appropriate. If the party opposing the public interest litigant is instead a
private party, then a no-way costs regime may be preferable. In essence,
the preliminary determination of costs in public interest litigation should
be a contextual exercise. Courts should take into account all of the factors
found to be relevant-the nature of the dispute, the financial status of the
192. Supra note 6 at paras 4-5: the Bands claimed that they had no way to raise the more than $800,000
required for trial, but that "even if they did, there are many more pressing needs which would have to
take priority over funding litigation." The chiefs testified that their communities were facing "grave
social problems, including high unemployment rates, lack of housing, inadequate infrastructure, and
lack of access to education."
238 The Dalhousie Law Journal
parties, whether the opposing party is a public or private entity, etc.-
and then tailor a costs award appropriately. Such an approach would best
achieve the goal of facilitating access to justice for public interest litigants
in a manner that is fair to all parties involved.
